

Shaping the Security Environment



Derek S. Reveron, Editor

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The amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA 1) operating an SH-60F Seahawk helicopter off San Diego, California, on 29 November 2006.

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Foreword

Newport Paper No. 29, *Shaping the Security Environment*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, makes an important contribution to an unfolding debate on the global role of U.S. military forces in an era of transnational terrorism, failed or failing states, and globalization. Reveron, professor of national security decision making at the Naval War College, looks beyond the current conflicts in which the United States is involved to raise fundamental questions concerning the regional diplomatic roles of America's combatant commanders (COCOMs) and, more generally, the entire array of nonwarfighting functions that have become an increasingly important part of the day-to-day life of the American military as it engages a variety of partners or potential partners around the world. These functions are increasingly being given doctrinal definition and a larger role in U.S. military planning under the novel concept of "shaping." This volume is intended to explore the notion of shaping in its various aspects, both generally and in several regional contexts.

The changing role of the regional COCOMs (formerly CINCs) over the last dozen years or so is the focus of a paper by General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), who provides a characteristically frank and illuminating account of his own tenure as commander of the U.S. Central Command, with responsibilities for the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. Papers by Commander Alan Lee Boyer, USN (Ret.), and Stephen A. Emerson examine maritime and regional security cooperation from the perspective of the U.S. European Command on the one hand and, on the other, the Combined Task Force–Horn of Africa, a joint organization headquartered in Djibouti that has played a critical role in recent years in strengthening the capabilities of countries throughout the region to improve their own security and counter terrorism.

Two further chapters examine aspects of shaping from a global perspective. Ronald E. Ratcliffe provides a searching analysis of the "thousand-ship navy" initiative proposed several years ago by outgoing Chief of Naval Operations Michael Mullen, including the difficulties the U.S. Navy has had in operationalizing this concept—and the difficulties some of our allies and partners continue to have in coming to terms with it. Ratcliffe makes a number of useful recommendations as to how the Navy can make headway in the area of maritime security cooperation in the coming years, which is likely to figure prominently in the new maritime strategy the Navy is

currently developing. Finally, Dennis Lynn looks at “strategic communication,” also a relatively new concept that is intended to bring greater coherence to the way the U.S. military thinks about the overall impact of its words and actions abroad and how it can better craft messages to shape the environment—friendly as well as adversarial—in which it finds itself today.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carnes Lord".

CARNES LORD

*Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island*

Acknowledgments

A volume like this requires many people thinking, critiquing, cajoling, and writing. First and foremost, Joan Johnson-Freese and Tom Fedyszyn in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College continue to create an atmosphere where good teaching and scholarly research can occur without compromising either. No less important is the vision Cary Lord and Pel Boyer at the Naval War College Press have for the Newport Papers series; I am grateful they find this research on shaping interesting and useful to military officers, policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The papers in this volume had numerous external readers. In particular, Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, Judith Stiehm, Chris Costa, Chris Fettweis, Andy Stigler, Tom Fedyszyn, Mike Morris, and Gene Christy provided important criticisms throughout. Editorially, I greatly benefited from Kirie Reveron, who tirelessly reads all of my work and is the best sounding board any scholar can have.

As a concept, my original thinking on shaping was formed during my tenure at NATO's military headquarters (SHAPE) in the late 1990s. While I expected to encounter a military focus on NATO, I was struck by how important the military is in what I had thought were nonmilitary activities, such as diplomacy and development. I am grateful to those officers I served and sparred with on the military's role in what I now recognize is a traditional military task—bringing peace and stability to facilitate democratization and development. My SHAPE experience produced the book *America's Viceroy*, but I am grateful to Toby Wahl for encouraging me to dig deeper into my experiences to uncover the larger theoretical and strategic basis for shaping presented here.

Shaping the Security Environment

DEREK S. REVERON

During my time as a CINC, I was asked to carry out presidential and other diplomatic missions that would normally have fallen to diplomats. I'm sure such things frustrated the State Department, but I don't think they disapproved. In fact, they were very supportive. It was more a case of: "Well, if we can't do it, at least somebody is taking care of it. If it's the CINCs, then God bless them." In fact, more often than not, the ambassadors were very glad we were there. We not only brought them the connections we'd made, but we provided them with the ability to get things done they couldn't ordinarily do.

GENERAL TONY ZINNI, USMC (RET.)

As the epigraph reveals, combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are warfighters, fulfilling as they do important diplomatic roles for the United States.¹ While the State Department is America's lead foreign policy organization, the Defense Department, whether in peace or war, cannot escape these roles. Moreover, it has a distinct advantage compared with the State Department both in size and resources, with an operating budget sixty times greater.² With its forward presence, large planning staffs, and various engagement tools, America's geographic combatant commanders are well equipped for these engagement tasks, and increasingly welcome them. Today, they routinely pursue regional-level engagement strategies by hosting international security conferences, promoting military-to-military contacts, and providing American military presence, training, and equipment. The Defense Department fills an important role in U.S. foreign affairs. This role, which is now commonly referred to by the term "shaping," is the subject of this volume.

In spite of the size disparity between State and Defense, the two organizations are mainly mutually supporting. American ambassadors are the president's representatives to a particular country, and U.S. military commanders assist in formulating and implementing the president's foreign policy. Both departments advance and defend national

interests. Yet the Defense Department's size and operational orientation give it significant advantages in the interagency arena. For example, when President George W. Bush announced that the United States would become more strategically engaged in Africa, it was through the creation of a new military command—U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)—and not simply upgrading the U.S. Agency for International Development or the State Department's Africa Bureau. Yet, tellingly, this new “combatant” command will have a decidedly interagency focus, as the president's vision for it suggests.³ The focus is intended to serve not only and indeed not primarily operational military purposes but the broader tasks associated with shaping—“to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.”⁴

These nonwarfighting roles of the U.S. military have attracted criticism both within and outside the military itself as being in tension or contradiction with the military's warfighting ethos. For example, John Hillen writes: “To maintain the skills necessary to execute this [warfighting] function requires strategy, doctrine, training, and force structure focused on deterrence and war fighting, not on peacekeeping missions.”⁵ Others have questioned whether military officers have or can reasonably be expected to acquire the linguistic skills and regional political and cultural knowledge to operate effectively as surrogate diplomats. Yet the fact is that military forces have always had important nonmilitary roles to play both before and after major combat operations, with respect to allies and adversaries alike.

Security assistance helps fledgling democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid failure, and authoritarian states liberalize. When he conducted engagement operations in the 1980s, before the term “shaping” existed, Admiral William J. Crowe, then commander in chief of Pacific Command, said that national leaders frequently told him that without American military presence their achievements in democracy and development would not have been possible.⁶ Security is essential for economic and social development. This sentiment is reflected in the Department of Defense document *QDR Roadmap for Building Partnership Capacity*, which targets efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Defense Department and its partners in extending governance to under- and ungoverned areas.⁷ To be sure, shaping is different in fundamental ways from warfighting. Shaping is about managing relationships, not command and control; it is about cooperation, not fighting; and it is about partnership, not dominance.

Nonwarfighting activities also fulfill important training, basing, and operational requirements for American forces. To advance American interests, combatant commands build partners' capabilities and capacity to generate security, influence


nonpartners and potential adversaries, mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and extremism, and enable rapid action when military intervention is required.⁸ Since combined operations are the norm today, U.S. forces need regular interactions with their international partners, with shaping constituting what has come to be known as “Phase Zero” (see figure 1).⁹

The six-phase model now utilized in current joint doctrine may give the impression that shaping is something that takes place only during the initial phase of a campaign, but this is a misapprehension; shaping is an ongoing set of activities, pursued alike in peacetime, crisis, and war. The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* makes clear that “shaping operations provide the joint force *continuous* opportunities to assess the structure and dynamics of potential adversaries and crisis locations to the extent practicable.”¹⁰ Overall, shaping activities fulfill current military strategic requirements of assuring friends and allies, dissuading potential competitors, and deterring conflicts in nonlethal ways. Shaping is not necessarily indicative of a precursor to a military campaign. Rather, it has become one tool—and an increasingly important one—in the arsenal of American “soft power.”

From Coercive Diplomacy to Soft Power

Writing soon after the Berlin Wall fell, former assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye commented, “Although the United States still has leverage over particular countries, it has far less leverage over the [international] system as a whole.”¹¹ Nye observed that not only was the international system changing from bipolar to unipolar, but that the nature of state power itself was changing. He claimed that traditional hard power—principally military and economic—would no longer be the single coin of national strength in a world that is increasingly interconnected and transparent. Instead, states and peoples were more likely to be affected through noncoercive measures or soft power, which Nye defined as “the ability to get what we want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”¹² This prediction bore itself out in the late 1990s, when

FIGURE 1
Phasing Model



Source: Adapted from Joint Publication 5-0, fig. IV-9

coercive diplomacy (in Yugoslavia) did not produce the desired effects, and in the early 2000s, in reaction to a post-9/11 American foreign policy.

Consequently, the U.S. government is currently placing renewed emphasis on generating soft power as a reservoir as a way to facilitate nonmilitary solutions to foreign policy problems. The Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, has testified to this point: “I believe there is no more important challenge for our future than the urgent need to foster greater understanding, more respect and a sense of common interests and common ideals among Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths throughout the world.”¹³ One way to do this is through global military engagement, which can build trust and structures of cooperation among key components of foreign societies. As Robert Art notes, “Short of waging war or playing chicken in a crisis, then, military power shapes outcomes more by its peacetime presence than by its forceful use.”¹⁴ While military leaders have historically represented their countries abroad, the doctrinal evolution of shaping has its roots in U.S. military engagement in the 1990s.

Roots of Shaping

President Bill Clinton’s *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, published in 1996, recognized the need to shift away from a strategy of containing communism to one of advancing market-oriented democracies. The strategy directed the military to engage with international partners and to provide a credible overseas presence: “Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, ensures familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities.”¹⁵ Being forward deployed during the Cold War had taught that “U.S. engagement is indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade to advance our interests.”¹⁶ Included in engagement, then, are supporting democracy, providing economic assistance, and increasing interactions between U.S. and other militaries around the world.

Taking its cue from the 1996 strategy, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) sought to codify shaping as a key element in the national military strategic outlook. Military leaders have always engaged or shaped their areas of responsibility, but the QDR recognized the need to shift from a Cold War posture to a global one in which allies and adversaries were less readily identifiable, and hence proactive engagement with foreign nations became more necessary.¹⁷ Positing a new foundation of “shape-respond-prepare,” the QDR not only emphasized the capability to fight and win two major theater wars but also placed “greater emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous overseas presence in order to shape the international environment.”¹⁸ A

major goal of shaping, then, is to reduce the drivers of conflicts through presence and strengthening partnerships with governmental, regional, and international organizations.¹⁹

Facing 1990s conflicts born of state failure in Central Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia, U.S. military forces were directed to conduct stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations with capabilities that had been geared for traditional warfare. The resulting experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina forced recognition in Washington that it is far more effective to prevent state failure than to become involved in the bloody conflicts resulting from them. Stephen Krasner, former State Department Policy Planning Staff director, captured this point well: “Weak and failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security.”²⁰ Consequently, the regional combatant commanders began to step up their engagement efforts. They utilized a wide variety of traditional means, including: forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs like defense cooperation, security assistance, and International Military Education and Training (IMET).²¹ This direction of effort is a decade old, but it has been reformulated as one of twenty-two joint capability areas (JCAs) recognized today.


Defining Shaping Operations

A new “joint operating concept” (JOC) elucidating the shaping construct is expected in late 2007. Absent that, as depicted in figure 2, shaping may be understood as including a set of distinct activities that combatant commanders use to advance and defend American interests.²² The Joint Staff (J7) defines shaping as:²³

The ability to support Joint Force, Interagency and Multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. Shaping is executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives and national goals. These activities are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing behavior of both adversaries and allies. Each capability supporting Shaping Operations, to include Information Operations, must adapt to a particular theater and environment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve effects in another.²⁴

Since shaping occurs during prehostility periods, commanders can more easily engage with both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. For example, in 2007, the USNS *Comfort* hosted U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Public Health Service specialists, along with Canadian forces and nongovernmental organizations to provide free health care services in the Caribbean and Latin America. Further, the definition underscores that operations must be adapted to a particular theater and environment. Logically, a naval security cooperation program that works in the Mediterranean may not work in the Gulf of Guinea. To develop shaping operations, commanders must

FIGURE 2
Joint Capability Area of Joint Shaping



Source: "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."

have a nuanced understanding of the countries involved, to include culture, history, politics, and economy. General Zinni recalls in his contribution to this monograph, "I found on my journeys that our commitment to stability in the region was widely appreciated but that our policies and priorities were sometimes questioned. Views of the threats varied greatly, as did opinions about handling them. The principal complaint was our failure to consult with them not only during but between crises. I found that cultural awareness was critical to building these relationships."

Military Diplomacy

Epitomized by the activities of geographic combatant commanders, military diplomacy brings all instruments of power to bear.²⁵ A primary shaping mission is to develop relationships and form partnerships. Reflecting on his command (in chapter 2), General Zinni remarks, "As my experiences throughout the region in general and with [Pakistan's president] Musharraf in particular illustrate, I did not intend to sit back and say, 'Hey, my job is purely military. When you're ready to send me in, coach, that's when I go in.' When I assumed command of CENTCOM and had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing them, I chose prevention. If there was any possible approach to making this a less crisis-prone, more secure and stable region, I wanted to try it through shaping operations." With a host of security cooperation tools, General Zinni shaped his region by hosting regional conferences, building strong security relationships and allied capabilities, and enhancing the education of military leaders throughout the Near East and Central Asia. Other geographic combatant commanders conduct similar activities. When he led forces in Pacific Command, for example,

Admiral Dennis Blair was a critical actor working with China after the 2001 midair collision between an EP-3 and a Chinese F-8. Also, successive commanders of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) facilitated entry of nine countries into NATO and smoothed relations with Russia over this NATO enlargement.

Military involvement in diplomacy does not or should not conflict with the role of the Foreign Service: “DoD’s role in shaping the international environment is closely integrated with our diplomatic efforts.”²⁶ In spite of this QDR statement, though, General Zinni has captured the challenges of synchronizing these activities: “I never found a way to effectively join forces with the State Department to link their plans with mine. I had no way to get answers to questions like, What’s the diplomatic component of our strategy? What’s the economic component? How is aid going to be distributed?”²⁷ While not unique to U.S. Central Command, the task of generating unified action through the interagency process remains a contemporary national security challenge. To overcome this, the Joint Staff recently established interagency coordination as one of its twenty-two “joint capability areas” (JCA). Moreover, some combatant commands have created an interagency directorate (known as J-9 at U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM), and the newest combatant command, AFRICOM, will have a decidedly interagency orientation when it begins initial operations in October 2007 and full operations a year later.

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) is defined as “the ability to understand, engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance American interests, and to collaboratively shape the operational environment.”²⁸ This capability can include public information activities as well as information operations designed to reach foreign audiences through websites, radio, print, and television. DSPD comprises the Defense Department’s support to U.S. government public diplomacy, which includes overt international public-information activities designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. “The current norm of ‘been there, done that’ visits should be transformed into *persistent, personal, and purposeful* contacts that yield results.”²⁹ For example, SOUTHCOM sponsors professional military education conferences to discuss regional security challenges, approaches to strategy, and capabilities-based planning. By bringing together key leaders from a particular country or region, SOUTHCOM facilitates dialogue not only between the United States and other countries, but also among countries in particular regions, such as the Caribbean, the

Andean Ridge, or the Southern Cone. Additionally, this can entail providing humanitarian assistance.³⁰

Strategic Communication

Strategic communication has been defined as “the ability to focus United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, and programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.”³¹ In general, strategic communication as it is generally understood (there is still considerable variance in the way the term is used throughout the American defense establishment) includes three primary elements: public affairs, aspects of information operations (particularly psychological operations), and defense support to public diplomacy. The State Department, in its capacity as the institutional home of public diplomacy, is the lead federal agency for strategic communication, but as its inclusion in the shaping JCA suggests, the Defense Department must become engaged too. Yet Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England has noted that “the U.S. military is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, and coordinate and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America’s interests.”³² Consequently, the Defense Department is pursuing a series of actions to increase its ability to conduct strategic communication and institutionalize it as a process. These actions are outlined in the *QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap*. Dennis Lynn argues in chapter 6 of this monograph that “America’s ability to defeat adversaries will require the creation of new coalition arrangements and taking the informational offensive.” To win hearts and minds, ideas matter; a strategic narrative that emphasizes a positive image of hope and opportunity must be promoted to enable international audiences to reject al-Qa‘ida’s message.

Presence

Presence is “the ability to appropriately position forces to advance and defend U.S. interests by supporting deterrence, projecting power, promoting regional stability and U.S. security commitments, and ensuring continued access.”³³ The general trend since the 1990s has been to reduce U.S. forward presence because forces are no longer expected to fight where they are stationed, as they were during in the Cold War. In European Command, for example, the force has been reduced from 248,000 in 1989 to fewer than 100,000 today. Overall, the United States closed or turned over to local governments 60 percent of its overseas military installations in the 1990s.³⁴ Simultaneously, EUCOM has also shifted its presence southward and eastward to engage in Eastern Europe and Africa. This trend continued under the 2004 global posture review and the

2005 Base Realignment and Closure effort. Essential to basing locations is building and sustaining political access to support U.S. military action when needed.³⁵

At the same time the base inventory has shrunk, the Navy's fleet has been reduced too. While the smaller force is more combat capable, the Global Posture Review and associated cutbacks undertaken by the Bush administration were primarily focused on seeking efficiencies with a view to conducting combat operations, not on posturing for shaping or Phase Zero operations.³⁶ Consequently, there are fewer bases and naval assets to serve as shaping platforms, and it remains to be seen whether rotational forces can create relationships as well as permanent ones. Force protection concerns also impact location and frequency of port visits. Notwithstanding reductions, the United States still maintains bases in at least forty countries, with the largest concentrations in Iraq, Germany, Afghanistan, Japan, and South Korea.³⁷ Geographic combatant commands are also represented in American embassies, through offices of defense cooperation and military liaison.

Additionally, the U.S. Navy is experimenting with other ways to enhance presence, such as "global fleet stations," which will "establish a self-sustaining sea-base from which to conduct regional operations, through tailored and adaptive packages, and to launch a variety of engagements with partner nations within a regional area of interest."³⁸ By including trainers, subject matter experts, and medical personnel on a naval platform, the global fleet station will give the Navy the ability to engage with many countries during a typical six-month deployment.

Security Cooperation

Security cooperation refers to "the ability for DoD to interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation, improve information exchange, and intelligence sharing to help harmonize views on security challenges, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure."³⁹ Underlying these objectives are seven themes: combating terrorism, transforming alliances and building coalitions for the future, influencing the direction of key powers, cooperating with parties to regional disputes, deterring and isolating problem states, combating weapons of mass destruction, and realigning the global defense posture.⁴⁰ For example, in the campaign to combat international terrorism, security cooperation provides training for indigenous forces.⁴¹ To do more of this, in 2006 the Marine Corps created the Foreign Military Training Unit to "train, advise, and assist friendly host-nation forces—including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them to support their governments' internal security and stability, to counter subversion, and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats."⁴²

Given its shrinking fleet and global challenges, the U.S. Navy too has embraced security cooperation. Two senior Navy strategists, Vice Admiral John Morgan and Rear Admiral (then Captain) Charles Martoglio, have declared: “Policing the maritime commons will require substantially more capability than the United States or any individual nation can deliver.”⁴³ Accordingly, the United States seeks partnerships with international navies to create what is being called the “thousand-ship navy,” which could respond to piracy, smuggling, and other illegal activities and protect important sea lines of communication. The Chief of Naval Operations reinforced this message in 2007: “Wherever the opportunity exists, we must develop and sustain relationships that will help improve the capacity of our emerging and enduring partners’ maritime forces.”⁴⁴ In ways exemplified by Task Force 150 and NATO’s Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, the thousand-ship navy, more formally known as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative, represents an effort to promote international maritime security. Essential to a successful global maritime partnership is building partners’ capabilities and capacity. Capabilities empower countries to carry out operations, while capacity gives these countries the ability to sustain the operations over time.

Building Military Partner Capabilities and Capacity

Building military partner capabilities is defined as “the ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coalition.”⁴⁵ As Commander Alan Boyer explores in chapter 3 of this monograph, Commander Naval Forces Europe (CNE) has been developing a capability for maritime domain awareness throughout Europe and Africa. CNE has been working with NATO allies and African partners to develop a regional capability to protect trade, natural resources, and economic development. This includes establishing maritime domain awareness through the Automated Identification System, an array of coastal radar systems, and improved command and control of a naval reaction force. A program like this is a part of a combatant commander’s “theater security cooperation plan” (TSCP), which serves as the primary blueprint for regional military engagement. To ensure that other federal assistance is synchronized with the TSCP, the country team prepares a “mission strategic plan” (MSP) that communicates to senior State Department officials in Washington how the mission will contribute to achieving the primary goals of American foreign policy and development assistance in that country.⁴⁶ In coordination with the senior Defense representative, the MSP recommends cooperative defense activities and funding of programs within the International Assistance budget, such as International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales, or Economic Support Funds, which are critical elements of the TSCP.

The current focus on transnational threats instead of nation-state competition has been the impetus for building new partnerships. The goal of capacity building is for partners to “take on missions that serve our common interests. These efforts range from spurring allied transformation efforts with NATO through acquisition and combined command-and-control programs, to security assistance activities that help professionalize the militaries of key partners in the war on terrorism or in peace operations.”⁴⁷

The benefit to the American personnel is training in new environments and building relations with their foreign counterparts. The obvious benefit to the international participants is in American training and financial assistance, which take on increasing importance as U.S. forces transform at a pace greater than their partners. These activities help ease interoperability gaps.

Augmenting military training is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which supplies grants and loans to finance purchases of American weapons and military equipment. The State Department oversees the program, but combatant commanders manage it on a day-to-day basis. In fiscal year (FY) 2007, the FMF budget was the largest program in the State Department’s international assistance account (known as the “150 account”), consuming over \$4.5 billion, which is 50 percent more than the Economic Support Fund and 60 percent more than the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative.⁴⁸ Of that \$4.5 billion, though, nearly 80 percent goes to two countries, Israel (\$2.3 billion) and Egypt (\$1.3 billion). Of the remaining 20 percent, just a few countries receive substantial assistance: Pakistan (\$300 million), Jordan (\$206 million), and Colombia (\$90 million). The remaining \$300 million is shared by sixty-six countries.

In addition to FMF, International Military Education and Training is an important security cooperation tool that provides training on a grant basis to students from partner countries.⁴⁹ The program is funded through the 150 account, but it is implemented by the Defense Department. From 1997 to 2004, IMET has funded sixty-six thousand participants, with a notable threefold increase from 1997, when there were 3,454 students, to 11,832 in 2004. Programs include attendance at U.S. professional military education institutions like the Naval War College, English-language training at the Defense Language Institute, or training activities like the basic infantry officer’s course. While the training is often well received, “it is tougher to quantify how such relationships can impact policy issues and ties between the international community and the U.S. as those students attain higher levels of responsibility within their government in the succeeding years.”⁵⁰ Yet General Bantz Craddock, head of U.S. European Command, testified in 2007, “IMET remains our most powerful security cooperation tool and proves its long-term value every day.”⁵¹ One major impact of IMET programs is building personal and professional relationships with people likely to rise to senior levels within their countries. As a testament to the quality of

selections for the Naval War College's Naval Staff College, for example, 236 participants have attained flag rank, 102 later served as chiefs of service, five became cabinet ministers, and one became his nation's president.⁵²

Regional Security Initiatives

Regional security initiatives are designed to strengthen the stability of partners.⁵³ While there are many ongoing initiatives, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is increasingly becoming the template. Concern over the growing threat of international terrorism in the Horn of Africa led in 2002 to the creation of CJTF-HOA “to prevent conflict, promote regional stability and protect Coalition interests.”⁵⁴ By conducting counterterrorism operations, building partner security capacity, and implementing civic action programs, the CJTF has sought to create an environment that is inhospitable to terrorist organizations. Rear Admiral James Hart, CJTF-HOA commander, has noted, “We’re arriving there early enough with an opportunity to help shape the environment, work towards a more secure environment, and hopefully, to allow people the opportunity to choose a direction to go in their lives that steers them away from extremism.”⁵⁵ Rather than relying on the hard edge of military power and an intrusive American presence, CJTF-HOA focuses on building schools and hospitals, digging wells, and providing other humanitarian assistance. These issues are explored by Steve Emerson in chapter 5, where he argues that “the burden of building political, economic, and social stability in the Horn needs to pass increasingly to other specialized elements of the U.S. government with the military moving from a leading to a supporting role.” Thus the challenge “becomes one of ‘demilitarizing’ and transforming CJTF-HOA into an inter-agency engagement tool.” While this is widely recognized, deploying sufficient numbers of non-military personnel from other federal departments has been problematic.

Resistance to Shaping

The growing diplomatic and other nonwarfighting roles of the combatant commanders have led some critics to worry that the United States has inadvertently created a problem for itself in the form of a new class of overly powerful and independent military officials, along the lines of the proconsuls of ancient Rome or the viceroys of British India. It is difficult to take such concerns too seriously, although a case can certainly be made for strengthening the civilian and interagency presence and role in COCOM headquarters. The 1990s “shape-respond-prepare” strategy did give rise to a “superpowers don’t do windows” argument, particularly within the military. Some identified diplomatic engagement by generals like Wesley Clark (as Supreme Allied Commander Europe), Zinni, or Charles E. Wilhelm (SOUTHCOM) in the 1990s, or state-building missions in Haiti,

Bosnia, and Kosovo, as inappropriate and distracting for an organization that is supposed to fight and win the nation's wars.

In what was largely a reaction to Clinton-era uses of the military, then presidential candidate George W. Bush declared, “I’m not so sure the role of the United States is to go around the world and say this is the way it’s got to be. We can help. I just don’t think it’s the role of the United States to walk into a country and say, we do it this way, so should you.”⁵⁶ Once elected, the Bush administration attempted to reduce engagement activities through largely symbolic acts. Engagement was recast as “security cooperation” to emphasize the security dimension of these activities. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld purposely set out to reduce the stature of the regional military commanders by reserving their former title “commander in chief,” or CINC, for the president alone. These officers accordingly reverted to their designation under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, “*combatant commander*,” with an emphasis on the *combat* role they are supposed to fill. However, as the engagement mission of combatant commands is institutionalized, combatant commander may give way to a new title of unified commander to ease concerns about U.S. military involvement around the world.

Some analysts also reacted negatively to what was sometimes cast as postmodern imperialism, a failure in civilian control of the military, or a major problem with the interagency process. Justin Logan and Christopher Preble found that the United States “has been overly prone to military intervention, without a proper appreciation of the costs ahead of time.”⁵⁷ John Hillen raised this concern about fears of overextension: “Most Americans would agree that the United States must be active in the world, but not so active that the effort wastes American resources and energies in interventions that yield little or no payoff and undermine military preparedness.”⁵⁸ Andrew Bacevich connected a tendency for the military to do it all with a disturbing trend within American politics that links “a militaristic cast of mind with utopian ends,” which leads to an increased propensity to use force.⁵⁹

Echoing C. Wright Mills’s findings from the 1950s, these and other critics claim American leaders increasingly tend to define international problems as military problems, a propensity that can preclude nonmilitary solutions.⁶⁰ For example, U.S. assistance to Colombia has a decidedly military focus, that of combating the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency, but it has been criticized by some for lacking the development assistance needed to reconnect FARC-controlled parts of the country with the center.⁶¹ Again, when in 1999 Slobodan Milošević’s Belgrade regime did not sue for peace after a few days of air strikes meant to end Serb ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, a protracted air war resulted, with a real potential to develop into a major ground campaign.⁶² The learning point, however, is the need to ensure that all elements of power are synchronized in the most efficient way to achieve the desired outcome. So

far, the data suggest that military-to-military contacts are positively and systematically associated with liberalizing trends throughout the world;⁶³ improved security in countries like Colombia have facilitated socioeconomic development.

Inevitably, concern about the nonwarfighting role of the military, which dwarfs other federal departments, fuels calls for interagency reform. Critics contend that if only the State Department were on an equal footing with the Defense Department, the United States would have a more balanced, less belligerent foreign policy. The effects of this imbalance were recognized by a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report: “As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps.”⁶⁴

Consequently, the Defense Department runs human rights initiatives and HIV/AIDS programs and hosts conferences on natural resource management. There is also disparity with regard to international assistance (the “150 account”). In contrast to public perceptions, the United States does not dole out suitcases filled with cash to allies; instead, foreign assistance typically takes the form of American defense goods and services (the largest line item is Foreign Military Financing). In spite of calls for budgetary reform to increase social and economic assistance, Congress simply finds defense issues more compelling. Politicians have an interest in associating themselves with ideas of patriotism and strength, so it is much easier to find advocates for exporting attack aircraft than for women’s empowerment programs. The conventional wisdom on the Hill indicates that while defense spending is understood by American voters to be a matter of national security, international assistance spending sounds less urgently important. In fact, most Americans are not even aware that foreign assistance represents less than 1 percent of the federal budget. The same Senate Foreign Relations Committee report that expressed caution about military activities in American embassies sees a solution by placing all security assistance under the authority of the secretary of state;⁶⁵ further, it recommends, “ambassadors should be charged with the decision whether to approve all military-related programs implemented in-country.”⁶⁶

Mitchell Thompson argues that a remedy for this political and budgetary imbalance necessarily entails “breaking the proconsulate.” Thompson writes, “Our current geographic Combatant Commands should be redesigned to break their heavy military orientation, and be transformed into truly interagency organizations, under civilian leadership, and prepared to conduct the full spectrum of operations using all elements of national power within their assigned regions.”⁶⁷ This call is echoed in our current strategy to combat international terrorism. This document sees the military playing only a supporting role to other federal departments, which can more appropriately counter terrorist ideology, interdict terrorist financing, and promote development

among vulnerable populations—tasks that are not core military functions.⁶⁸ With the creation of an interagency-focused AFRICOM and after analysis of SOUTHCOM's engagement activities, Thompson's hypothesis can be tested.

While such reactions have been real and sometimes dramatic, efforts to reduce the nonwarfighting role of combatant commanders have largely failed. The Bush administration could not escape from the reality that there is a global demand for U.S. engagement programs and that the military is the federal department most capable of doing the engaging. In fact, Congress in the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act recognized this: "Civilian agencies of the United States Government lack the capacity to deploy rapidly, and for sustained periods of time, trained personnel to support . . . operations in the field."⁶⁹ Further, the latest QDR chose "shaping countries at strategic crossroads" as one of its four focus areas, out of potentially hundreds of possibilities.

Geographic combatant commanders offer the president an important tool of power that can be exercised in a wide variety of realms: political, economic, military, social, and informational. If it is important to illustrate national security resolve by deploying an expeditionary strike group (ESG), that same ESG can deliver humanitarian assistance in stability operations or offer training platforms in shaping operations. Tom Barnett, for example, has argued the Defense Department must embrace this mission and develop unique capabilities.⁷⁰ Additionally, Congress tends to favor the Defense Department through the appropriations process, and this endowment enables the military to conduct engagement activities with little noticeable impact on its ability to conduct major combat operations. The Defense Department can and does execute the full range of military operations. An exercise like COBRA GOLD simultaneously brings the U.S., Thai, and other regional militaries closer, tests expeditionary warfare concepts, and implements humanitarian assistance programs.

Setting this aside, the military's active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude cooperation with the State Department. In fact, combatant commanders work extremely closely with their political adviser and the country teams where their engagement programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, tensions arise having strategic impact. "Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated."⁷¹ However, both American ambassadors and combatant commanders understand that they need each other's cooperation. If done well, military shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities, beginning at the

national level, where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the national security strategy, which in turn drives theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans.⁷² Yet an ambassador's focus on one country and a combatant commander's focus on an entire region necessitate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coordination but also interagency and combined planning.

Outside the United States, opinion on U.S. engagement is mixed. Majorities in thirteen out of fifteen publics polled say the United States is "playing the role of world policeman more than it should be." This is the sentiment of some three-quarters of those polled in France (89 percent), Australia (80 percent), China (77 percent), Russia (76 percent), Peru (76 percent), the Palestinian territories (74 percent), and South Korea (73 percent).⁷³ The data suggest that countries do not necessarily want to be "shaped." Ron Ratcliff, in his chapter in this monograph, sees this phenomenon in reaction to the thousand-ship navy concept: "However logical and benign the thousand-ship navy seems to the United States, other countries remain openly wary of its intended purposes and possible unintended consequences."

While negative feedback to American activities is substantial, however, negative reactions appear to be based on the mode of involvement rather than the involvement itself.⁷⁴ Publics around the world do not want the United States to withdraw from international affairs but rather want the United States to participate in a more cooperative and multilateral fashion.⁷⁵ Majorities in thirteen of fifteen publics polled (Argentines and Palestinians disagreed) support U.S. involvement in a more cooperative and multilateral fashion through international institutions instead of what they perceive as irresponsible unilateralism. For its part, the United States has learned that being a superpower does not make it a superhero that can accomplish anything it desires. Consequently, the nation has been attempting to coordinate engagement activities to confront transnational security challenges more effectively instead of trying to provide alone for global security.

A Common Language

I believe if you have these kinds of relationships they would go a long way to ensuring that we don't get into a war or get into a fight with people that we're engaged with like this.

ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN, USN

To date, the rationale for shaping as a military activity has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would inevitably produce military intervention, and that accordingly the Defense Department should support other countries

through constructive engagement.⁷⁶ The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* makes clear that “in addition to crisis response, the future joint force must be more involved in proactive engagement/crisis prevention. Peacetime shaping operations might be aimed at spreading democracy, creating an environment of peace, stability, and goodwill or even aimed at destabilizing a rogue regime.”⁷⁷ Therefore, the military should preempt state failure and bolster weak states through regional-level strategies formulated and implemented by geographic combatant commanders. The forthcoming joint operating concept on shaping emphasizes that a joint force commander must mobilize and sustain cooperation to achieve common security goals that prevent the rise of security threats and promote a constructive security environment in the region.⁷⁸

While nonmilitary agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development maintain the federal government’s core expertise in promoting development, neither it nor nongovernmental organizations can function in areas lacking security or without adequate resources. Consequently, the military, through geographic combatant commands, often attempts to build global security through military-to-military contacts, weapons transfers, and combined training activities. Shaping enhances relationships and strengthens partners to combat transnational security challenges. Further, since militaries play important roles in many societies, senior American military officers share with their counterparts a common language, one that is used by the Defense Department to create and maintain a global network of military bases essential for shaping and responding to crises. Essential to shaping are not only interagency coordination but also international coordination and partnerships. Other countries in the world have military engagement programs of their own, which may or may not support American interests. It is critical to understand the extent to which the shaping activities of the United States and other nations are mutually supporting, overlapping, or contradictory.

In conclusion, the question is not whether the military should be engaged in nonwarfighting activities or the shaping mission in particular. Congress and the president will almost certainly continue to rely on the military for such missions. Rather, the issues are how these operations should be structured to ensure unified action by civilian and military organizations and identify new capabilities that are necessary to perform these engagement missions efficiently.

Notes

1. Tom Clancy with General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: Putnam, 2004), p. 319.

2. The U.S. State Department has about eight thousand Foreign Service Officers stationed around the world and an operating budget

of about \$12 billion. In contrast, the Defense Department has several hundred thousand personnel deployed, military personnel in almost every U.S. embassy, and an operating budget about sixty times greater than State's. See Government Accountability Office, *Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps* (Washington, D.C.: August 2006).

3. "Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa." "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa," 6 February 2007, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/.
4. Charles F. Wald, "New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 43 (4th Quarter 2006), p. 73.
5. John Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," *Orbis* 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 242.
6. William J. Crowe, Jr., "U.S. Pacific Command: A Warrior-Diplomat Speaks," in *America's Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 74.
7. *QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy Dept., 25 September 2006).
8. "Military Support to Shaping Operations JOC," Combined Joint CDE Conference Presentations, 9 January 2007, available at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/conf_jcsg.htm.
9. "The general phasing construct can be applied to various campaigns and operations. Operations and activities in the shape and deter phases normally are outlined in SCPs and those in the remaining phases are outlined in JSCP-directed OPLANs. By design, OPLANs generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed elsewhere. CCDRs generally use the phasing model to link the pertinent SCP and OPLAN operations and activities." U.S. Defense Dept., *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: 26 December 2006), p. IV-35 [emphasis supplied].
10. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), p. 9 [emphasis supplied].
11. Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* (Autumn 1990), p. 156. "Soft power" is that generated by cultural, political, and economic behavior, but it is better thought of as a by-product rather than a raw material. Soft power is noncoercive, not simply nonmilitary. On this point, see Joseph Nye, "Think Again: Soft Power," *Foreign Policy Web Exclusive*, 23 February 2006.
12. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p. x.
13. Karen Hughes, "The Mission for Public Diplomacy," *Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 22 July 2005, available at www.state.gov.
14. Robert J. Art, "The Fungibility of Force," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 6th ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 4.
15. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: White House, February 1996), p. 17.
16. Ibid., p. 14.
17. Reveron, ed., *America's Viceroys*.
18. William S. Cohen, *1997 Quadrennial Defense Review* [hereafter 1997 QDR], "Secretary's Message," available at www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/msg.html.
19. See "Military Support to Shaping Operations JOC."
20. Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2005), p. 153.
21. 1997 QDR. "Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives." Programs include: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the Economic Support Fund. See U.S. Defense Dept., *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: 17 September 2006), p. VII-7.
22. It is important to note that some of these capabilities are tier 2 and are included in other tier 1 JCAs, like shaping.

23. The forthcoming shaping JOC written by JFCOM and EUCOM proposes the following as a definition: "The set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international government and nongovernmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur." Author interview.
24. "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon, post 24 August 2006 JROC," available at www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/.
25. "Military diplomacy" is defined as "the ability to support those activities and measures U.S. military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships." "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."
26. 1997 QDR.
27. Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 135.
28. "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."
29. Joint Forces Command and European Command, "Military Support to Shaping Operations" (unpublished draft), Joint Operating Concept, 5 June 2007, p. 13.
30. Government Accountability Office, *Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of Agencies' Marking and Publicizing Efforts* (Washington, D.C.: March 2007).
31. "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."
32. *QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap*, p. 2.
33. "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."
34. Ryan Henry, "Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 13–28, repr. in Carnes Lord, ed. *Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century*, Newport Paper 26 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, February 2006), chap. 2.
35. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
36. Completed in 2004, the global posture review produced a new basing construct to include main operating bases (MOBs), forward operating sites (FOSs), and cooperative security locations (CSLs). The more austere facilities—FOSs and CSLs—are focal points for combined training; they will expand and contract as needed to support military operations. See Henry, "Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture."
37. U.S. Defense Dept., *Base Structure Report*, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf.
38. Navy Office of Information, *Rhumblines: Global Fleet Station*, 10 April 2007 (unpublished).
39. "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."
40. U.S. State Dept., *Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, September 2006), available at www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmrpt/2006/74679.htm.
41. U.S. Defense Dept., *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: March 2005), p. 15, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf.
42. U.S. Marine Corps, "Foreign Military Training Unit," *U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command*, www.marsoc.usmc.mil/FMTUHome.htm.
43. John Morgan, Jr. [Vice Adm., USN], and Charles Martoglio [Capt., USN], "The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 131 (November 2005), p. 17. See also Admiral Michael G. Mullen, "What I Believe: Eight Tenets That Guide My Vision for the 21st Century Navy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 132, no. 1 (January 2006).
44. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, "Priority Tasking Memo," 7 March 2007 (unpublished).
45. "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."
46. To implement an MSP, "country operational plans" detail the use of foreign assistance funds for the implementation year. U.S. Department of State, *Strategic Plan FY2007–2012*, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/82819.pdf.

47. Douglas J. Feith, "Transformation and Security Cooperation" (speech, 8 September 2004), available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=145.

48. "Foreign Military Financing Account Tables," *U.S. Department of State*, www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/html/60203.htm. It is important to note that military assistance for Iraq and Afghanistan is not included in this account data.

49. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *International Military Education and Training*, www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm. For some countries, especially middle-income ones, an IMET allocation is seed money; they spend considerably more of their own money to participate in programs. Also, and very effectively, IMET funds Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), whose American trainers provide in-country training. Obviously, MTTs reach more people, but the opportunity to gain an appreciation of the United States is reduced. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195) formally defined the purposes of IMET as: "(1) to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; (2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries; and (3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights."

50. Ronald H. Reynolds, "Is Expanded International Military Education and Training Reaching the Right Audience?" *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* (Spring 2003), p. 94.

51. General Bantz Craddock, *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee*, 15 March 2007, p. 11.

52. Bill Daly, "Building Global Partnerships," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 133, no. 4 (April 2007), pp. 44-47.

53. The Joint Staff J7 (Director, Operational Plans and Joint Force Development) defines it as "the ability to reduce partner nations' vulnerability to aggression and coercion while limiting the options of would-be opponents." "Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon."

54. *Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa*, www.hoa.centcom.mil, March 2007.

55. "New U.S. Task Force Commander, Staff Prepare for Posting to Africa," *Armed Forces Press Service*, 19 January 2007.

56. "Excerpt of Presidential Debate October 12, 2000," available at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec00/for-policy_10-12.html.

57. Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, "The Case against State's Nationbuilding Office," *Foreign Service Journal* (November 2006), p. 55.

58. Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," p. 257.

59. Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), p. 3.

60. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956).

61. Myles R. R. Frechette, *Colombia and the United States—The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame?* Letort Paper (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, February 2007).

62. See Derek S. Reveron, "Coalition Warfare: The Commander's Role," *Defense and Security Analysis* 18, no. 2 (June 2002), pp. 107-22.

63. Carol Atkinson, "Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000," *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2006), pp. 509-37.

64. *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 15 December 2006, p. 2.

65. Section 1206 funding refers to legislation that authorizes the use of Defense Department funds to build the capacity of a foreign country's military forces to conduct counter-terrorist operations or to participate in or support military or stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are involved. This falls outside the normal security-assistance budgeting process implemented under State Department authority.

66. *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, p. 3.

67. Mitchell J. Thompson, "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power," *Parameters* (Winter 2005–2006), p. 63.

68. *National Strategy for Combating International Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2006); *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, February 2005).

69. *FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act*, sec. 1222, para. a2.

70. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Putnam, 2004).

71. *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, p. 2.

72. Joint Publication 5-0, p. II-8. In European Command, for example, NAVFAC, working with the U.S. Department of State, EUCOM, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, led a ministerial-level conference on maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. See Craddock, *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee*.

73. "World Publics Reject US Role as the World Leader," WorldPublicOpinion.org.

74. Lisa Haugaard argues that a tarnished U.S. image in Latin America is nothing new but reflects historical frustration with interventions and American trade policy. But frustrations have been exacerbated by reductions in military assistance, disputes over the International Criminal Court, and the Guantanamo Bay detention center. See her *Tarnished Image: Latin America Perceives the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Latin America Working Group Education Fund, March 2006), available at www.lawg.org/docs/tarnishedimage.pdf.

75. Steven Kull, *America's Image in the World*, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, 6 March 2007, available at www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/.

76. Epigraph from "CNO: Humanitarian Missions Essential to Relationships, Global War on Terrorism," *Navy Newsstand*, 19 June 2007.

77. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, p. 9.

78. Joint Forces Command and European Command, "Military Support to Shaping Operations" (draft), p. 6.

Military Diplomacy

GENERAL TONY ZINNI, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED)

On 13 August 1997 I became the sixth commander in chief (CINC)* of the U.S. Central Command. While I had previously been the command's deputy and engaged in the region since 1991, my immediate priority as CINC was to reshape our strategy in light of our ever-changing area of responsibility and the emerging global strategy of the Clinton administration. We needed a structure, a strategy, and clear objectives to meet the many challenges in one of the riskiest parts of the world. Without these, our day-to-day work would have no focus.

I stepped into my tour as head of Central Command with the knowledge that I was facing a volatile and crisis-prone part of the world, of vital importance for global energy, and that the disorder, instabilities, and conflicts in the region were likely to present our nation with ever more dangerous crises in the near future. The list of security challenges was long. Iraq had been a running sore since its invasion of Kuwait. Iran had been a running sore since 1979 and its subsequent war with Iraq. The Taliban was ruling Afghanistan. Even then, we were aware that al-Qa'ida was dangerous, and it was not the only Islamist organization that gave us concerns. Terrorists in Egypt had recently killed Western tourists. Yemen was trying to stabilize itself after coming out of a terrible civil war but faced serious frictions with the other countries of the region. There were internal instabilities in almost every country. And every country had a border dispute with some neighbor. Somalia remained a failed state. There was an ongoing civil war in Sudan. Ethiopia and Eritrea had a longstanding and often violent border dispute. There were border tensions in the Caspian between the Iranians and the Russians—with oil as the prize. Pakistan and India remained in conflict, with constant flare-ups over Kashmir. There were even problems in otherwise idyllic places like the Seychelles, where Asian fishing fleets were poaching. Everywhere there was smuggling and drug trading; terrorist activity was increasing. Everywhere I looked I could see dangerous instabilities.

* Since 24 October 2002, "combatant commander" (CCDR).

In light of these security challenges, I asked myself: “Can I do anything about this?” Obviously, I had a direct responsibility as commander to manage the conflicts and crises that might involve our military. Yet, I was also trying to find ways to minimize our own direct military interventions in these crises. To do this, we had to avoid putting our own boots on the ground. The simple answer was to prevent crises, but how?

The answer to that question presented an even greater challenge. We had to build order and stability that might head off conflicts and crises before they hurt us or anybody else. I started looking at what we could do here to move this crisis-prone region toward greater stability. We had a choice. We could sit back in a secure location like a fireman, wait for the alarm, and then rush off to put the fire out. Or we could move into the neighborhood and locate all the fire hazards and then get rid of them. In short, with a good engagement strategy, we could head off future crises by building local capacity to deal with indigenous threats, pursuing regional security initiatives to inspire cooperation throughout the region, and developing trust among U.S. friends and allies through increased security cooperation activities.

Central Command’s Security Environment

When I assumed command in Tampa, Central Command was responsible for twenty countries (soon to be twenty-five); it was a diverse region that spanned an area from East Africa through the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia and into the Indian Ocean. Yet the command’s near-total focus was on the Persian Gulf and our long-standing problems with Iran and Iraq. We were operating under a national security strategy called “Dual Containment,” whose objective was to protect Gulf energy resources, contain both Iraq and Iran, and maintain local stability. We were the only unified command with two major “theater of war” requirements (as we say in the military): fight Iraq or fight Iran. These threats were not about to go away during my three-year tenure, yet other parts of the region were heating up, requiring us to broaden our focus beyond the Gulf states. Weapons of mass destruction were proliferating all throughout the region. The Iraqis had used them in the 1980s. The Iranians were acquiring them. Pakistan and India were in serious conflict over Kashmir, and both countries were nuclear powers.

Compounding the extant threats, we’d had little recent contact with Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, or Somalia. My goal was to change that, and the national security strategy demanded that shaping activities increase. Developing relationships with Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and the Seychelles required new engagement programs. Long-standing relationships with Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman had to be maintained and strengthened. We had to rebuild our shaky relations with Pakistan. Most of the Muslim states of Central Asia

that had split off from the Soviet Union—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—were added to Central Command's area of responsibility. While the tendency is to lump all of the “stans” together, each had its own special problems (including a civil war in Tajikistan) and needed its own distinct relationship with the United States.

Beyond Warfighting

Central Command found itself in a bubbling pot of crises from one end to the other. We had to develop a theater strategy to handle them without necessarily using military

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force. We needed to help build stability in this troubled region, in my view, or we would pay the price in the long run.

We were not approaching this process with a blank slate. Since Central Command was probably the most volatile region in the world, we were starting with thirteen preexisting war plans, an exceptionally large number for a geographic combatant command. These plans gave us a warfighting orientation that we were well postured to deal with, thanks to the work of my predecessor, General J. H. Binford (“Binnie”) Peay, U.S. Army. We now needed to expand and broaden the strategy beyond warfighting. In order to get a better fix on all the issues, I talked first to my commanders and then sought input from friendly leaders of the nations in the region and from American diplomats with expertise in the area, to ensure that we were all working in sync.

For the bigger picture, we turned to President Clinton’s emerging national security strategy, with its stress on engagement and multilateralism. The military implementation of this strategy is the job of the secretary of defense, whose national military strategy looks at the national security strategy from a specifically military point of view. Every four years, the secretary of defense presents to Congress and the president what is called the “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR), which offers still more specifics about how the military side of defense is going to execute the national security strategy. It directs the combatant commands to build new strategies for our assigned regions based on these concepts. The QDR directed the CINCs to “shape, respond, and prepare.” This reflected not only the warfighting responsibilities (respond, prepare) but the new charge to “shape” our areas of responsibility.

The secretary of defense also directed the CINCs to prepare “theater engagement plans” for their areas of responsibility. This is our strategy for engaging with the countries with whom we have relations on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, it is our plan for helping friendly countries build their militaries, for cultivating and building coalitions for security cooperation, and for welding together viable multilateral teams to deal collectively with the chronic problems we face and to stabilize the region. In other words, it is the “friendly” side of our overall strategy.

Shifting Gears

The first problem Central Command had to fix was the near-total focus on the Persian Gulf. To that end, I decided to “subregionalize” our strategy, by breaking the AOR into four subregions: East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southwest Asia, and Egypt and Jordan—developing a strategy and programs for each. This approach would ensure that our Gulf-centric tendency did not detract from the programs and relationships we developed in

other areas. Though I knew this would not be a clean separation—many interests overlapped—I felt we could accommodate that.

Because the nations of each subregion had their own problems, we also had an articulated strategy for each country. In addition, I assigned each of our military components “focus” countries that fit their capabilities and their compatibility with the militaries of these nations. This spread the burden and balanced the span of control in managing our various engagement programs and crisis response requirements.

I then broke down our strategic goals into three areas: warfare, engagement, and development. The warfighting goals were designed to have in place the right plans, forces, and basing options for any possible crisis. We also built a basis for responding to crises cooperatively with regional allies, through training, exercises, military assistance, intelligence sharing, military schooling, and the like.

Our engagement goals were designed to build strong security relationships and allied capabilities and to enhance the education of military leaders and familiarize them with principles and values that drove our military system. Though much of this area was related to warfighting, it went beyond that to work in cooperative areas that were not strictly military, such as environmental-security issues and natural-disaster responses. This built the day-to-day military relationships and capabilities needed to respond to crises and work as a combined team.

Our development goals were objectives for establishing new relationships, improving regional stability, and countering emerging threats. They were also related to the development of Central Command itself as it evolved to meet future challenges and a changing defense environment. These were the primary “shaping” efforts directed by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. In designing this ambitious strategy, we cooperated closely with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and our State Department partners at embassies throughout the region and at the regional bureaus in State’s Washington headquarters. Our strategy also reflected ideas contained in the Clinton administration’s new global strategy and from my own lifetime of experience in the military, in conflict resolution, and in peacemaking.

The Clinton strategy represented a significant shift in the way the United States related to the rest of the world. Though the administration did not always handle this shift as effectively as it could have, its overall approach was, in my view, correct. Unfortunately, the Clinton strategy lacked the resources to be implemented fully and effectively, and it was hampered by competing views of foreign policy—“engaged” or “isolationist.”

The “engaged”—people like Woodrow Wilson, George C. Marshall, and Harry Truman—believe we can prevent conflicts by actively shaping the environment that produces them,

by directly involving our military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities in the world to make conditions better, to stabilize the various regions, to build partnerships, and by doing it collectively—by using the United Nations and regional (or larger) multilateral coalitions and institutions. In the long run, they see engagement as less costly than any of the alternatives. Diplomatic solutions are always preferable to military operations.

The “isolationists” fight this view. They see the world as so big, so messy, so out of control that nobody can fix it. Even if we could help a little here or there, dozens of other hopeless cases lie festering. And besides, who says we have any responsibility for the rest of the world anyway? Who made us the policemen of the world? We should be bringing troops home, not committing them to useless foreign “engagements.” Who said we have to suffer all the risks and shoulder all the costs of making the world better? Foreign aid is just another way to throw good money down a bottomless hole. We could use it better at home tending—and protecting—our own garden. Yes, we have friends whom we will continue to support. We have interests that we will protect. But that’s all the involvement in the world that we want or need. During the Clinton years, Congress generally tended to back the isolationist side and was not supportive of providing resources for engagement, which defined U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s. Consequently, the State Department’s resources were cut and the U.S. Information Agency was collapsed into State; that left the Defense Department in the best fiscal situation to engage.

Engagement

Engagement was not an airy concept (though many portrayed it that way). It came with nitty-gritty specifics (though these varied, depending on whether the country in question was an adversary, a friend, or potentially a friend). We had very formal ways to “engage” both militarily and diplomatically (the two had to work in tandem). And we expected these to lead to clear and specific results. Just as the term implies, through “security assistance” we help other nations improve their security situation by improving their military and security forces.

Thus when we embarked on a new relationship of engagement (as we did in my time with the Central Asian states or Yemen), we’d usually begin programs informally, in a small way, and later we’d make them more formal: put them into one or more of the categories, set up a program to develop their actual resources, set up and fund joint training programs, and the like. In other words, engagement might start informally, but it was expected to grow into a more formal relationship. I felt that if we were more aggressive and did a better job of planning and coordinating engagement programs—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, etc.—we could truly “shape” a more stable, secure, and productive environment in troubled regions of the world.

The Clinton administration's engagement policies had the added effect of building on a process that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and the end of the Cold War had already started—the expansion of the role of the CINCs in their regions. Goldwater-Nichols gave more power to the CINCs, but primarily as warfighters. By the end of the 1990s, Goldwater-Nichols had come into bloom: the CINCs had become far more than warfighters, and the Clinton administration gave the CINCs all around the world a mission to shape their regions and use multilateral approaches in ways that went beyond the CINCs' traditional military role.

This was not simply a wish. The administration strongly promoted and stressed this change, and its members made very clear that they wanted the CINCs to implement it. But not everyone welcomed it, including the CINCs themselves. The change came because there was no other choice. No one else could do the job. My activities and those of my CINC colleagues are explored in depth in Derek Reveron's *America's Viceroys*.* What I lived and Reveron documented is the vital role that the military plays in U.S. foreign policy, which is much broader than fighting wars.

Importance of Cultural Awareness

My first trips as CINC to the AOR were dedicated to building relationships. I insisted on taking no issues to the regional leaders on the initial trips (and fought off staff members with lists of demands, requests, and points to be made). I was not going out there to talk business. I wanted to listen to the concerns of the people and hear their views of our role. It was an enlightening experience: meetings with heads of state, such as President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hussein of Jordan, were a novelty for me, but I found it easy to engage these personable leaders.

I found on my journeys that our commitment to stability in the region was widely appreciated but that our policies and priorities were sometimes questioned. Views of the threats varied greatly, as did opinions about handling them. The principal complaint was our failure to consult with them not only during but between crises. I found that cultural awareness was critical to building these relationships.

The Arab world conducts business far more casually than we do or than people do in Europe, the Pacific, and other places where I'd served. In America or Europe, the meetings are structured. There's a timetable and an agenda. You limit small talk and feel guilty when you indulge in it. You tick off items that must be covered. And once they're covered, you instantly move on.

* Derek S. Reveron, ed., *America's Viceroys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

That's not the way Arabs like to do business. They don't jump directly into the "big issues"; they prefer a far more casual mix—and not because they don't understand the issues. Rather, it's the way they connect and take the cut of a man. Personal relations and trust built out of friendship are more important than just signing paper agreements. They'll sit around a room and drink coffee, eat some nice food, laugh a little, and have an easygoing conversation about their families, hunting, the weather, or anything else that doesn't seem terribly important. In time, they'll subtly work their way toward the business at hand and deal with it. But don't try to rush them. When Westerners—even CINCs—have tried that, it's led to problems.

Our way of conducting business just doesn't work there. When we try it, we're not well received. Yet politeness, graciousness, and hospitality are so inbred in Arabs that we may not recognize that they've turned off to us. They will always be polite to guests. Hospitality is more than just civility in that part of the world; it's a duty and obligation. To be inhospitable or impolite is a sin. On the other hand, they really take to people who like their kind of personal interaction. But doing that right is truly an art—an art I've always enjoyed practicing.

Shaping in Practice

Our day-to-day strategy—what we then called the Theater Engagement Plan—was supposed to be a theater approach to implementing the Clinton national security strategy (as modified and specified by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in his "shaping the environment" policy, whose aim was to use our power and influence to bring nations in our region to greater stability). As our staff went through the process of developing our plan, it seemed wise indeed to integrate our efforts with the State Department and other government departments and agencies to bring to bear all the capabilities of the United States in a focused way to achieve the administration's goals.

Integration never truly happened. I never found a way to join forces effectively with the State Department and link their plans with mine. I had no way to get answers to questions like, What's the diplomatic component of our strategy? What's the economic component? How is aid going to be distributed?

And yet we tried!

Through my superb political adviser and State Department liaison, Ambassador Larry Pope, I communicated with my counterparts at the State Department, the regional assistant secretaries, and the ambassadors of the countries within Central Command, and I found kindred souls there. They wanted to cooperate, but I found a tremendous void in the diplomatic connections in Central Command. There was a void in expanding the

personal relationships that Generals Hoar* and Peay had worked hard to create. There was a void in establishing and implementing policy. The void came from several causes.

First, the State Department had not been given the resources it needed to do the job. The neo-isolationists had cut foreign aid, leaving the State Department without the wherewithal—the people, the money, the programs—to make the impact it should have been making. Second, while the end of the Cold War had greatly diminished the chances of a world-spanning conflict, crises had begun to pop up all over the place; the military found itself involved in confronting all of them, even those that were not totally military problems. Finally, the CINCs now had resources the State Department did not have; the power of the CINCs was now growing (a reality recognized throughout our region), and they soon became the chief conduits for engagement activities. Much of what got done was done through the CINCs.

During my time as a CINC, I was asked to carry out presidential and other diplomatic missions that would normally have fallen to diplomats. I'm sure such things frustrated people in the State Department, but I don't think they disapproved. In fact, they were very supportive. It was more a case of, "Well, if we can't do it, at least somebody is taking care of it. If it's the CINCs, then God bless them." In fact, more often than not, the ambassadors were very glad we were there. We not only brought them the connections we'd made but provided them with the ability to get things done they couldn't ordinarily do.

Like most CINCs, I tried to work very closely with the State Department. In every country, our ambassador is the president's representative. I never did anything that an ambassador did not know of and approve. Moreover, the CINCs often had more personal presence and far more connections than the ambassadors. In many countries in Central Command's region, for example, the senior government leadership is also the senior military leadership. This is not our system (and the downsides are obvious), yet the fact had practical consequences. These leaders were more comfortable with soldiers than with diplomats in many cases.

Anything we did for the ambassadors had to have some military overlap. We couldn't simply blatantly set up an aid program. But even here we had some room to maneuver. In Africa, for example, we might be engaged in teaching a country's military how to conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian operations; we might set up training exercises in the villages. I would send my military veterinarians, dentists, and doctors (who needed the training anyway) into the villages with the African country's military, and they'd conduct the exercises together. In the context of the military exercise, we'd build

* General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, was Commander, U.S. Central Command from 1991 to 1994, when he was relieved by General Peay.

an orphanage or paint a school or set up a clinic as a civic action project. We'd be providing our guys with useful training while showing the African troops actually how to do it; at the same time, we were helping needy people. When the exercises were over, we would have the American ambassador cut the ribbon for the new clinic. It was important, in my mind, always to demonstrate civilian leadership of our military and the close cooperation between our diplomats and soldiers.

Given the relative frequency of natural disasters in Central Asia and the Near East, we decided to hold conferences on disaster assistance in some of these countries. The nations brought their fire, police, emergency service units, and military people; we brought experts from the United States, who showed them how to intermix the civilian and military and cooperate with each other—and we did all this in the name of the American ambassadors. We held other conferences in the region on environmental security issues, justifying them from the point of view that the military had to be good stewards of the environment too.

In organizing environmental security conferences, the term “security” was key. An “environmental” conference on disposal of hazardous waste, for example, would not have played well back at the Pentagon. We had to have a “military” or “security” connection. Armed with that, we could bring in the Environmental Protection Agency to talk about how to deal with hazardous waste material. Then I could bring in the ambassador and expand the conference to other issues, even human rights. (Human rights issues are very important militarily when you are trying to teach the importance of “winning hearts and minds” to military forces with no history of these considerations in their operations.)

All of these forms of engagement build strong relationships with countries. They tie in important military and nonmilitary programs. And from there we are able to move on to more sophisticated joint training and military assistance projects that promote strong military-to-military relationships and build better capabilities. Everybody benefits.

In spite of the good work being done in the field, not everybody back home saw things that way. The struggle went on and on between the longing to lean forward into the world and do what we could to shape it and the isolationist passion to block all that. Though I had many disagreements with the Clinton administration, its basic global strategy was right. I was out in the world and saw the needs, the newly emerging conditions, and how we could help to change them. I also saw that if we failed to change them, we were doomed to live with the tragic consequences.

The current Bush administration has seriously limited the powers of the CINCs; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had a passion for centralized control, changed their name. They are no longer CINCs; they're just “combatant commanders.” Coming

into office in 2001 the administration wanted to withdraw America from “nation building” and other engagement activities, but it soon discovered that there was a serious demand in the world for U.S. leadership and assistance. Ironically, shaping activities are more important than ever.

I believe that military force does not solve every problem, nor is it our only form of national power. There are other kinds of pressure and other kinds of support. In order to achieve our national goals, we have to combine every capability in our national bag in the most artful mix possible. But that’s hard when the political infighting spills over into the implementation end of policy. Even if the CINCs produced good strategies at their level (and I believe we did), with good ends and reasonable ways to achieve them, we still had no idea whether or not the administration and the Congress would come through with the means.

The Washington bureaucracy was too disjointed to make the vision embodied in all the strategies, from the president’s to the CINCs’, a reality. There was no single authority in the bureaucracy to coordinate the significant programs we CINCs designed. The uncoordinated funding, policy decisions, authority, geographic assignments, and many other issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security Council, and other government agencies, making it difficult to pull complex engagement plans together.

Security Cooperation Activities

To implement my security cooperation activities, I had hundreds of military and civilian personnel throughout the region. They coordinated and administered foreign military sales, military exercises, military school attendance, training, and other cooperative efforts with local militaries. Along with the military attachés at American embassies, they provided the CINCs and diplomats with vital links to local leaders. They were the day-to-day connections to the local militaries and were an invaluable means of communication with the military and political leadership in the various countries. The job they do has never been valued by superiors, and promotions for those of them in the military have never come easily.

Previously, we had almost always done business with each country individually. I wanted to change that. I wanted our regional allies to begin to think collectively about security issues. Since our biggest obstacle was the reluctance of the Arab countries to embark on a collective security relationship with the United States, I knew it would take time to develop what I hoped to achieve. Nevertheless, I felt that if I could put issues of common interest on the table as starting points and get agreement on these, we’d at least be moving down the right path. I found two such issues: theater missile defense and environmental security.

An important element in my developing strategy was to build up the security capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC—the Gulf regional security coalition of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait). I knew this was going to be difficult. Multilateral cooperation did not come easily to the members of the GCC. In fact, bilateral cooperation with the United States often came more easily. That often made us, and not the GCC, the glue in the region. In the long run, that wasn't to their advantage or to ours. I hoped to make the GCC the glue and to move us into a support role.

The slender levels of cooperation in the GCC come out of the historical evolution of the states, whose development has followed different paths from ours or Europe's. After World War II, the United States and Europe were confronted by an expanding and hungry Soviet Union. Collective security proved to be an effective and lasting counter to this threat. The American-and-European-designed NATO evolved into the greatest military coalition in history. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are not yet ready for that kind of coalition.

Enlightenment on this subject came to me early in my tour as CENTCOM commander, during a conversation with an ambassador to the United States from the region. “Why does the GCC seem unable to turn into a strong regional structure like NATO or the EU?” I asked him.

“You know,” he explained, “we put on this face of Arab brotherhood and unity. But it’s only a face. We’re all very different from each other. You have to understand where we are in our history,” he continued. “You’re expecting us to act like the Europe at the end of the twentieth century. But that’s not where we are. We’re more like Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. We don’t yet have much trust and confidence in each other.”

He was right. The more time I spent traveling through the nations of the region, the more I came to understand how remarkably different they are from each other. The histories of Arab nations after World War II will tell you how difficult it has been to create an Arab coalition. Powerful, charismatic leaders such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser tried it and failed. The ambassador also made me realize the most important key to regionalization—that the nations have to be ready for it. There has to be ripeness. Convincing Europe to build a cooperative regional identity and a regional capability before World War I—or in its aftermath—would have been unthinkable.

Regional coalitions don’t happen just because regionalization is a lovely idea. The nations have to be ready for it. They’ve got to build it from some small base that doesn’t make any of them nervous. From this seed, trust and cooperation may grow. If we were going to

build regional capability, I concluded, we had to lead off with smaller programs that would build trust.

Surprisingly, and serendipitously, as I was starting to work on these issues the GCC nations had already begun to resolve some of their long-standing political differences on their own initiative. A particularly nasty dustup had encouraged the Saudis and the Yemenis to resolve their border issues; the Yemenis also resolved their border issue with the Omanis; and Oman, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain put a tense border dispute up for international arbitration, then accepted the results.

The resolution of these differences ignited momentum for what I planned to do next: find nonthreatening ways to encourage them to work together and to work with us as a coherent entity. But my ultimate goal was to shape them into a viable collective security arrangement. I wanted them to work together for their mutual defense. I wanted them to exercise together (their combined exercises were that in name only), and I wanted them to have the same military standards, an integrated command and control system, and combined and focused capabilities. And when the time came, I wanted their militaries to be able to fight together. In those days they had none of that. Without it they could not effectively deter or deal with regional hegemons who threaten stability.

I knew I was not going to achieve wonderful results quickly. Attempting that leap in a single move was never going to work. I had to come up with a program we could undertake together, that they could collectively support. I wanted an issue on which there would be no disputes—an issue so benign, so innocuous, so nonthreatening, and so agreeable that they could not possibly argue over it. And I wanted to give them positive reasons to work together.

Building Bridges

The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council could not fail to be aware that the growing missile proliferation in the region was a real problem, and they all knew they needed a coordinated regional defensive capability to deal with it. We had therefore proposed that the United States provide the technology and organization skills to pull it all together, and they had agreed to discuss this at a conference. But first we had to steer through their instinctive suspicion of our motives. Some saw our proposal as an attempt to rope them into buying high-cost American systems, while others saw it as a scheme to pull them into an arrangement that specified a particular enemy. Yet these suspicions were allayed, and then the conference really took off, especially when we offered to share early-warning information. This enabled us to build some momentum in the region on other issues.

A more promising focus for cooperation, however, was water. Though water sources are a potential source of conflict in the region, the GCC members have very powerful incentives to cooperate over that issue. They all take much of their water from the Persian Gulf, and they all depend on desalination plants to make it drinkable. They would all benefit from cooperating to protect the Gulf. If, for example, the Iranians were ever to decide to attack the Arabs, one of their first actions would likely be to pollute those waters and take out the desalination plants. They are strategically vital to the states along the Gulf.

Once again, my ultimate goal had nothing to do with whether or not the GCC states cooperated over water. That was the entry point, the easy one, the Coal and Steel Community that became the European Union. The issue was not water. It was cooperation. We arranged regional environmental conferences focused on water issues. Representatives from the GCC came, and we brought experts from the EPA and other U.S. agencies. We discussed shared experiences, issues, and problems; we looked at various capabilities and technologies—developing desalination technology, handling hazardous waste material, monitoring cleanups, taking preventive measures during disposal. We looked at efforts we could take cooperatively, like combined exercises or cooperative organizations to control and contain oil spills or other contamination. The environmental conferences were a great success; the GCC leaders loved them and wanted to continue them.

Military Diplomacy

While a good strategy shapes the security environment, strategy is also shaped by it. I was reminded of this by Pakistan's response to India's nuclear weapons test. In May 1998, Pakistan was scheduled to test its own nuclear weapon, an act that would drastically escalate tensions in the region and the world. In an effort to persuade the Pakistanis not to test, the State Department planned to send Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot and the assistant secretary for the region, Rick Inderfer, to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and other members of the senior Pakistani leadership. I was to accompany them. The mission was not going to be easy. Relations between the United States and Pakistan were already tense. The Pakistanis had backed our efforts in Afghanistan during the Afghan rebellion against the Soviets; there was now a large number of refugees—as well as a state of chaos—on their western border as a result, and we had (in their view) dumped them.

The Pakistanis' bitterness had increased when we imposed sanctions over their weapons of mass destruction program. Specifically, we had refused to deliver F-16s they had bought and paid for, or even to return their money; then we'd deducted storage fees for the planes from what they had paid. No surprise, they were enraged. (The anger was

compounded after many pilots flying older planes were lost, which wouldn't have happened if they'd had the F-16s.) Our treatment of Pakistan was working against our interest. This was a state on the edge; the government was shaky and badly corrupt; and politically powerful Islamists were inflaming the population. If Pakistan failed or turned into an Iranian- or Afghan-style theocracy, we would have major problems in the region. We did not want nuclear-armed Islamist radicals then any more than we do now.

The delegation flew to Tampa to join me on the twenty-two-hour flight to Islamabad. As we prepared to board the Central Command 707, word came that the Pakistani government had decided not to approve the visit. This triggered a flurry of diplomatic calls from the waiting room at our air base, calls that were made more urgent by the approach of our drop-dead takeoff time—if we didn't get in the air within two hours, our crew's permissible flying time would run out.

When the calls kept getting negative results, I proposed to Secretary Talbot a back-channel approach. If I called General Jehangir Karamat, the chief of staff of Pakistan's military, I thought he would okay the trip. Karamat was a man of great honor and integrity, and a friend. Relations with Pakistan hung on the thin thread of a personal relationship that General Karamat and I had agreed to maintain.

“Go ahead,” the secretary told me, though his face was skeptical. But when I called General Karamat, he promised to take care of the problem; a few minutes later we were in the air—further proof, if the secretary needed it, that the relationship between our two militaries remained strong, in spite of the strained relationships elsewhere. Though Washington had severely limited the military-to-military connections I could make, the personal connection to General Karamat I had insisted on maintaining now proved its worth.

In Pakistan, we met several times with Prime Minister Sharif and his ministers but were unable to convince them not to test. The domestic pressure to respond to the Indian tests was too great. As we left, I had a few private moments with General Karamat, who shared with me his frustration with his corrupt government. Pakistan's military leaders had more than once seized power from the elected government. Though others in the military had urged him to follow that tradition now, he assured me he could never do that. He kept his word, but that did not stop a military coup later that year.

Round Two

At the end of July, on another trip to Pakistan, I visited some of the more remote and rugged parts of the country—the Line of Control Area of Kashmir, the nearby Siachen Glacier, and the fabled Khyber Pass, on the western border with Afghanistan. In these wild mountains, Pakistani and Indian troops had faced off against each other for decades at altitudes in excess of twenty thousand feet. If the fighting didn't kill you, the weather

and altitude would. To my surprise, the two countries had, for the most part, succeeded in containing the fighting to this dangerous and volatile, yet well defined, area. But that “happy” situation was going to change in a matter of months.

In May, Pakistani forces made a deep incursion into an area called Kargil on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Though there was normally “fighting” near the Line of Control, the area for a long time had been quite stable. There’d be probes and shooting during the good months of the year, but nothing ever changed much; in wintertime everybody would pull back down into the valleys, and the two sides would create a “no-man’s-land.” As spring came, they’d go back up into their positions.

Every so often, somebody on one side would be a little late getting up to their spring position, and the other side could grab an advantage of a kilometer or so. It was like “Aha, I’ve gotcha!” on a tactical level. But it didn’t really change things. This time, however, the Pakistanis waylaid the Indians and penetrated all the way to Kargil. This was such a deep, significant penetration that it went beyond the tactical; it threatened Indian lines of communication and support up to Siachen Glacier.

The Indians came back with a vengeance. There were exchanges of fire; there was a mobilization of forces; there were bombing attacks; and planes were shot down. Then the two sides started to mobilize all their forces all along the line; it was beginning to look like the opening moves of a larger war. It got alarming.

I was therefore directed by the Clinton administration to head a presidential mission to Pakistan to convince Prime Minister Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, to withdraw their forces from Kargil. I met with the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad on 24 and 25 June and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: “If you don’t pull back, you’re going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be very bad news for everybody.” Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces.

That got Musharraf’s attention; and he encouraged the prime minister to hear me out. Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face), but I insisted; he finally came around and ordered the withdrawal. We set up a meeting with Clinton in July.

Round Three

In October 1999, the tension between the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan finally came to a head. The government was freely elected but outrageously corrupt. The military found itself between a rock and a hard place. If it let the situation continue, the rot could grow bad enough that the country would collapse—a very real possibility. But there was no way to change this situation by the normal liberal democratic rules.

Sharif set in motion his own downfall by trying to fire General Musharraf, while Musharraf was out of the country, and putting the chief of intelligence in his place. He had originally given Musharraf the job as head of the army under the misperception that Musharraf would be easy to control. He had not reckoned on the general's integrity.

In response to Sharif's move, the Pakistani army executed a coup. The coup was moving to its climax as Musharraf was flying home; for him, success was to be a very near thing. His aircraft came back into the country low on fuel; the airports, still under the control of Sharif's forces, were closed to him. At the last possible moment, forces friendly to Musharraf took over an airport, and the general landed. Prime Minister Sharif was soon placed under arrest, and Musharraf declared his intent to clean up governmental corruption and install true democracy.

The coup did not play well in Washington, and I was ordered to cease communications with General Musharraf. Though I thought the order was stupid, I complied. But the following month, while in a reviewing stand in Egypt during Exercise BRIGHT STAR, I received a call from General Musharraf. Since Secretary Cohen was near me, I asked what he wanted me to do. He said, "Take the call, but don't make any commitments."

It was a personal call between friends, Musharraf explained (though, of course, we both knew that any conversation would have wider ramifications). He wanted me to know what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had had no other choice. The point he made then was a powerful one: "Democracy and the ballot are both a sham when any government that results can offer everything they control up for sale. We've had a democracy of form, and not a democracy of substance. I want democracy in substance, I'll work for that, no matter what it costs me. And there's one more thing I have to make clear," he told me. "I don't care what most others think about my motivations or intentions, but it's important to me that you know what they are."

I thanked him for his candor and wished him well. When I briefed Cohen on the call, I made clear that it was more important than ever to stay connected to Pakistan. He understood what I was saying, but he didn't think Washington would be convinced.

Round Four

In December, Jordanian intelligence uncovered a massive plot to kill American tourists at the turn-of-millennium celebrations in Jordan and throughout the Middle East. The captured terrorists, who had links to Osama Bin Laden, revealed that their immediate leaders were in Pakistan.

Calls soon came from the State Department and National Security Council: “Please call Musharraf and ask him to help.” And I did.

In response to my requests, Musharraf arrested the terrorists (giving us access to them and to their confiscated computer disks) and threw in several other favors.

“Now do something for Musharraf,” I told Washington. “Or at least let us reconnect.” The answer was no; I called Musharraf and told him how disappointed I was.

I told him, “I know what courage it took to do what you did for us. So it’s doubly embarrassing for me that I can’t give you anything in return.”

“I don’t want or expect anything for what I’ve done,” Musharraf replied. “Tony, I did it because it was the right thing to do.”

Incompatible Cultural Prisms

As my experiences throughout the region in general and with Musharraf in particular illustrate, I did not intend to sit back and say, “Hey, my job is purely military. When you’re ready to send me in, coach, that’s when I go in.” When I assumed command of CENTCOM and had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing them, I chose prevention. If there was any possible way to make this a less crisis-prone, more secure and stable region, I wanted to try it, through shaping operations.

I recognized that no single nation in the region was capable of coping with its instabilities. But could we create regional capabilities to cope with them? That is, could we build and support regional coalitions of friendly nations who could cooperatively take on local instabilities? Since it would be their commitment to building stability, they would own it and feel responsible for it. And since they were not outsiders in the region (as we were), there would be greater acceptance of their presence. Obviously, they would need our help. Whatever we invested in these projects would pay off later in regional stability, order, and peace. It was far better to invest a little now than pay a lot later to end a crisis.

The Central Command experience taught me a lot about the world and the role of our great nation in it. We could make a difference if we were committed to standing up to our obligations, not only as the last remaining superpower but also as the last beacon of hope

for many people on this planet. But what is necessary to understand is that no place on earth has simple problems that lend themselves to simple solutions. The skillful blending and application of all our elements of national power, the cooperative participation of partners in implementation, and the full understanding of the complexities and nuances of the situation are absolutely necessary to putting together the right policies and programs and, most importantly, to implementing them effectively. Too frequently we have applied simplistic and ad hoc approaches to complex problems.

Deeper understanding of our place in the international order, our partners, and the world is necessary. Achieving stability and improving national security is not a simple matter of building capacity. Rather, we need to find mechanisms like shaping to reduce friction, which comes from distrust, fear, or uncertainty. Those with a vested interest in the status quo or in other outcomes will resist change. Yet, the strongest resistance normally originates in the cultural differences that create seemingly incompatible prisms through which the various parties see the issues. Culture is formed by history and geography; it generates the customs, beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a society. Too often, we fail to analyze and understand these factors. Instead, we use our own cultural prisms to determine how things should be done and in what order. We use them to assume superiority and rightness in all issues. We use them to stereotype and generalize. At best, this failure causes us serious problems in the world. At worst, it leads to conflict, chaos, and war.

In spite of this, forty years as a Marine taught me that the only place to be is in the center of the arena. You get knocked down, and you make mistakes. But you also realize that it sure beats sitting in the grandstands criticizing those who have the guts to be out there, and every once in a while you can make a difference—and we must make a difference. America has to lead. We have no choice. We're the eight-hundred-pound gorilla in an eight-by-ten room. We may not like being in this position, and we may wish we didn't make everybody else in the room nervous, but we can't help being who we are. But by shaping operations we can decrease tensions around the world, build trust among neighbors, and create the conditions to reduce conflict.

Acknowledgment

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Maritime Security Cooperation

COMMANDER ALAN LEE BOYER, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED)

Our job is to promote peace and stability through maritime partnerships and deny violent extremists or rogue nations the opportunity to strike.

ADMIRAL HARRY G. ULRICH, USN

Prior to 2004, shaping activities carried out by American naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) consisted mainly of presence and military diplomacy.¹ Presence in the Mediterranean was performed primarily by the Sixth Fleet command ship, USS *La Salle* (AGF 3), stationed in Gaeta, Italy; the submarine tender USS *Emory S. Land* (AS 39) in La Maddalena, Italy; and typically a destroyer on a six-month deployment assigned to Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60). Other naval forces would deploy to the region for operations and training exercises for shorter periods of time, usually as part of their transits to and from the Arabian Gulf. No permanent presence was maintained in the Gulf of Guinea. Naval security cooperation was largely carried out through regular port visits in the Mediterranean and other related activities by the Sixth Fleet staff members embarked on *La Salle*. This was supplemented with port calls by the CTF 60 destroyer and transiting ships. GOG naval diplomacy was limited to the participation of one or two ships in the biannual West Africa Training Cruise and infrequent short port visits by single surface combatants deployed to the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility.² The dominant focus was not shaping but the conduct of and planning for war and contingencies in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Since 2004, the focus of Commander Naval Forces Europe—Commander Sixth Fleet (CNE-C6F) has shifted from defense to security-related activities aimed at fostering maritime safety and security. Its operational concept now relies on shaping operations designed to build partner capabilities and capacity to respond to maritime security threats and challenges. Its operational focus has also changed, from Northern and Western Europe toward the east and south.³

MAP 1
Gulf of Guinea



This chapter will examine Mediterranean and GOG threats and challenges, strategic objectives, CNE-C6F's operational concept, and the ways and tools that command uses to conduct shaping operations. It will conclude with a discussion of implications for the future.

Threats and Challenges

Since the end of the Cold War, the way European Command (EUCOM) and CNE-C6F understand security has shifted, due to globalization and the demise of great-power competition in Europe. Emerging threats, often from transnational actors and weak states, have become increasingly important concerns. In March 2005, General James L. Jones, the EUCOM commander, described the changed security environment in this way: “The new security menace is transnational and characterized by enemies without territory, borders, or fixed bases. Threats include the export and franchising of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, uncontrolled refugee flow, illegal immigration and piracy on the seas.”⁴ Admiral Harry G. Ulrich, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, has similarly identified illegal fishing and the illegal siphoning off and transporting of fuel, environmental degradation, smuggling, piracy, proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illegal actions as major threats in the GOG.⁵ The most significant maritime threats include piracy, pollution, illegal fishing, and trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons. Local and transnational criminal groups account for most illegal activities; however, private citizens and business interests also engage in illegal actions that threaten economic stability and security.

Terrorism and Armed Groups

Maritime terrorist attacks have been rare in CNE-C6F's area of responsibility, yet terrorists have been active in the Mediterranean. Such groups as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Hezbollah, and Hamas have used the sea to channel funds and materiel for operations in Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian territories. In 2001 al-Qa'ida used the Mediterranean to support operations ashore and planned attacks on ships in the Mediterranean.⁶ Today, in addition to al-Qa'ida, several other terrorist groups are active in North Africa, although none has demonstrated a maritime capability.

In the Gulf of Guinea, transnational terrorism identified with Islamic extremists is not the threat;⁷ instead, the threat is from local armed groups seeking concessions from national governments.⁸ These groups are most active in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.⁹ Groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta have engaged in a number of such illicit activities as kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering, oil infrastructure sabotage, and attacks on security forces. Their demands have included the "creation of additional states for Ijaws [a collection of subgroups indigenous to the delta region], amenities and jobs for rural communities, contracts and oil concessions for faction leaders and even calls for independence."¹⁰ Nigeria's inability to govern the Niger Delta has effectively created an ungoverned zone where armed groups can flourish. A major concern of military planners is that such ungoverned areas could destabilize the region and become havens for transnational terrorists.¹¹

Illicit Activities

Immigration and Human Trafficking. A major humanitarian, economic, and security challenge for both regions, particularly the Mediterranean, is the movement of people. Every year, hundreds of millions pass through the Mediterranean's ports.¹² Most are legal travelers, but hundreds of thousands attempt to cross borders illegally. Most originate from sub-Saharan Africa, but they also come from Asia, the Maghreb,* Syria, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, and India. The major transit routes are across the Strait of Gibraltar; from Libya, Tunisia, Albania, and the Balkans to Italy; and from the Canary Islands to Spain. Several thousand vessels smuggle illegals across the Mediterranean each year.¹³ People seeking illegal passage reportedly pay between two and six thousand euros to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa.¹⁴ Transporters range from small-time operators in the west to transnational criminal networks in the east. Terrorist

* Traditionally northwestern coastal Africa, centered on the Atlas Mountains; the Arab Maghreb Union, formed in 1989, comprises Morocco (which has annexed Western Sahara), Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.

MAP 2
Mediterranean



organizations like the PKK and al-Qa‘ida reportedly engage in human trafficking to fund their primary operations.¹⁵

The magnitude of maritime human trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is significantly less than in the Mediterranean. Most human trafficking in the Gulf occurs on land and stays within the region—except for Nigeria and Togo, from where women and children are trafficked to Europe. The GOG state most concerned about maritime illegal immigration is Gabon, which considers this its most significant maritime threat.¹⁶

Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Conventional Weapons. Although ever increasing in scale, the maritime aspect of illicit drug and weapons trafficking in the GOG is relatively small. For Mediterranean states, drugs and weapons are significant problems. Europe consumes approximately 33 percent of the world’s illicit drugs.¹⁷ Some, like cocaine or heroin, are transported by sea from other parts of the globe, which is one of the most important activities of organized crime groups and networks in Europe. While this is not yet the case for criminal groups operating in the GOG, that may be changing. Recent seizures in Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria of cocaine bound for the United States indicate the presence of European and Latin American criminal networks in Western Africa. The region may be becoming not just a transit area but a “stockpiling logistics base for drug trafficking.”¹⁸

The Mediterranean too has a long history of trafficking in weapons and explosives. Recently, most of this activity has occurred in the eastern Mediterranean, due to armed

conflicts in the Balkans and the Palestinian territories, perpetrated by small freelancers as well as larger and more sophisticated transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.¹⁹ Evidence of illicit weapons trading includes maritime seizures of assault rifles, explosives, and detonators on board internationally flagged vessels.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). A major security objective for the United States and its Mediterranean partners is nonproliferation. In the maritime domain, the problem has two dimensions. First, hostile nonstate actors may exploit the sea to transport WMD for use against the United States and its allies.²⁰ Second, states and entities acting under state cover could use the sea to transport WMD materials. For Gulf of Guinea states, WMD proliferation is less of a concern.

Environmental Degradation. A more significant threat to the economic and social health of GOG states arises from environmental degradation caused by lawlessness at sea due to these states' inability to monitor and control effectively their coastal waters and exclusive economic zones. Poaching by Asian, European, and other African vessels is estimated to cost the region \$370 million annually.²¹ Angola lost 19.3 percent of its catch value in 2004 due to unreported and unregulated fishing.²² Other factors contributing to environmental degradation are gas flaring, toxic waste dumping, uncontrolled discharge of human and domestic waste into the ocean, and coastal erosion. Eutrophication (overenrichment of nutrients) and oxygen depletion of water, particularly around the urban areas, have resulted in decreased fish levels and an increase of waterborne diseases.

Piracy and Illegal Oil Bunkering. The two remaining threats found in the Gulf (though not in the Mediterranean) are piracy and illegal oil bunkering. Thirty-two of 239 (13 percent) of the world's maritime armed robberies and piracy attacks in 2006 occurred in the GOG. Nigeria experienced the third-highest number of attacks and the most maritime kidnappings.²³ Illegal oil bunkering is also a significant problem in the GOG. Experts estimate from seventy thousand to three hundred thousand barrels per day are bunkered illegally in Nigeria.²⁴ The money funds local armed groups, criminal syndicates, and corrupt government officials, which decreases the revenue available to national governments to finance development in health, education, or infrastructure.

Challenges

The two most significant strategic challenges that impact shaping operations are globalization and governance at the national and regional levels. As Admiral Ulrich asserts, "globalization has connected us."²⁵ The speed and number of ways in which people interact is changing due to globalization flows (information, technology, goods, people, and ideas), and globalization continues to change the nature of the operational space in which

planners and practitioners conduct their shaping activities. Recent manifestations include the continued evolution of a just-in-time global supply chain, seaborne trade, and the proliferation of Internet and cellular telephone-based information technologies.²⁶

While globalization undergirds the security environment, however, a more important factor is governance. The quality of governance at the national and regional levels directly relates to political will, capacity, and capability to respond to security challenges; to resource availability; and to the ability to cooperate and form partnerships. Governance as measured by the World Bank's six "worldwide governance indicators" shows that European partners (France, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal) and Israel (except in the "political stability/no violence" indicator) generally score in the top 25th percentile. North African countries' scores, while they vary considerably, on average fall into the lower end of the middle percentiles (25th to 75th). In the GOG, most states score in the bottom percentile in almost all indicators, except for Ghana, which on average scores higher (between 45th and 59th on all indicators) than any North African state.²⁷

Numerous reasons exist for the poorer governance in the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa. A significant cause, especially in the GOG, is corruption. With the exception of Ghana, all the GOG states' scores on the World Bank's corruption index are under 30. Corruption, weakness of institutions, and lack of resources make it very difficult for these states to find and sustain the political will needed to effect change.²⁸

Without that political will, countries are unable or unwilling to build effective institutions, sustain domestic, regional, or interagency cooperation, or enforce domestic and international laws. The United States and its European partners generally have sufficient political will in this respect, as manifested by relatively high levels of maritime cooperation, improved interoperability, and shared awareness of maritime threats. Tangible evidence of this political will is seen in the U.S. *National Strategy for Maritime Security* and a major new European Union (EU) maritime policy paper.²⁹ Less political will has historically been present in North African states; however, a change over the last several years is evident in improved information sharing with NATO, improved interoperability, and increased patrolling of maritime zones. In the GOG, political will is weak or often absent, especially regarding maritime safety and security. This lack of will also results in poor maritime threat awareness, land-centric approaches to policy, and the overwhelming of government authorities by the magnitude of maritime security challenges.³⁰

Strategic Objectives and Requirements

The strategic requirements that CNE-C6F's shaping activities must meet are fourfold. The first requirement is to prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists,

criminals, or hostile states to harm the United States, its people, economy, property, allies, or friends.³¹ Strengthening allies and partners is the second requirement.³² The third is to defend the United States forward—that is, to prevent enemies from attacking the homeland by defeating them overseas.³³ The final requirement is to expand peace and prosperity to Eastern Europe and Africa.³⁴ According to the EUCOM *Maritime Security Strategy for Africa*, this last requirement cannot occur if the maritime domain is ungoverned. Therefore, if CNE-C6F can help Gulf of Guinea states secure their natural resources, their governments “could begin to move away from their present status as aid recipients; and instead could begin to address poverty, hunger, and security issues themselves.”³⁵ Essentially, the overarching security objective for CNE-C6F is to improve significantly maritime security in its area of responsibility by building partnerships and partner capacity to deal with maritime threats—both key “tier two” joint capability areas (see chapter 1).

CNE-C6F Operational Concept

The approach Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet has adopted to advance peace and stability in its area of responsibility is based on creating maritime safety and security. At the March 2006 Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Workshop, in Accra, Ghana, Admiral Ulrich summed up the ideas behind CNE-C6F’s concepts with three points: “First, that maritime safety and security are vital for economic development and human security. Second, maritime safety and security requires maritime domain awareness. Lastly, it is impossible to have maritime safety and security without multinational cooperation.”³⁶

CNE-C6F is attempting to take a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to maritime safety and security. Unlike in the past, the current concept relies heavily on shaping activities and supports a long-term focus. The stated timeline for the GOG is ten years, although CNE-C6F planners acknowledge that in fact it will likely be a generational or a multigenerational effort.

The ways employed are generally pragmatic in nature due to the challenges and partners involved. The main methods include theater security cooperation (TSC), the leveraging of operations and security arrangements to improve cooperation in order to combat terrorism and other illicit activities at or from the sea, improvement in awareness, and the sharing of information. By capitalizing upon security frameworks such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue, and bilateral arrangements, CNE-C6F is attempting to build on past cooperation and common interests.³⁷

Two tenets guide CNE-C6F’s shaping efforts. First, the staff believes, solutions should be based on regional and national needs and contexts. Experience has taught CNE-C6F planners that the best solutions are ones that each nation and region develops on its

own. By making support available, CNE-C6F believes, it has a better chance of allowing local “ownership” and of creating long-term sustainability. Second, activities should support and facilitate action across the full spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power. Unity of effort and cooperation with interagency, inter-governmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners should be fostered whenever possible. CNE-C6F views maritime forces collectively as a tool that should support partner efforts to improve underlying conditions in both the Gulf and the Mediterranean.

Shaping Tools

Differing capabilities of CNE-C6F partners determine the tools the command uses in each instance of its engagement activities. In the Gulf, shaping tools focus primarily on building awareness of the need for maritime safety and security. Efforts to build capacity and capability to deal with and respond to maritime threats and challenges are still in their infancy in the region. In the Mediterranean, due to the existence of the EU, NATO, and other such capable partners, shaping tools focus on the full range of maritime security activities, ranging from awareness to information sharing and response-force capabilities.

Mediterranean Shaping Tools

One of the main tools CNE-C6F and its NATO partners use for shaping is Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE). NATO launched OAE in October 2001 under Article V of the Washington Treaty as a part of its response to the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.³⁸ OAE’s stated purpose was to detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity. Initially, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR focused on naval presence and surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Since then, the North Atlantic Council has expanded the geographic and operational scope of OAE three times. ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR forces are used for the following tasks: helping deter and disrupt support to terrorism at or from the sea; controlling choke points—the most important passages and harbors—by deploying minehunters from standing NATO mine countermeasures groups to carry out preparatory route surveys; providing escorts through the Strait of Gibraltar when necessary; and enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue and other NATO programs to promote bilateral and multilateral relations.³⁹

Approximately a dozen ships from NATO navies are typically assigned to Joint Task Force Endeavour. This dedicated force gives NATO a visible presence at sea to deter terrorism and other illicit activities in the sea lanes and to react to a broad range of contingencies, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.⁴⁰

In addition, the operation also improves interoperability, builds capacity, and generates cooperation and information sharing.

At the strategic level, NATO also uses ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR as a vehicle for political engagement with non-NATO states. The June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul invited non-NATO countries (among them Russia, Ukraine, and Mediterranean Dialogue countries) to participate in OAE. Since then, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Israel, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Albania, Croatia, Sweden, and Finland have expressed interest in joining the operation on some level. Categories of participation include political discussion and intelligence sharing as well as providing forces. Of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, Israel and Morocco have been the most active. At a 7 April 2006 meeting in Rabat between NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Israel, and Morocco agreed to join in naval counterterrorism patrols.

An OAE-affiliated undertaking is Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH), launched on 1 March 2004 by the Turkish navy. The objective is to ensure the “smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish straits as well as maintaining navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea maritime domain” until a Black Sea Force is able to assume this and other maritime security duties on a permanent basis.⁴¹ In this venue the United States is able to leverage its NATO relationship with Turkey to obtain more information on Black Sea traffic before it arrives in the Mediterranean. NATO also takes advantage of OBSH as a way to build capacity within regional navies (including those of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine).

Gulf of Guinea Shaping Tools

Building a culture of maritime safety and security is significantly more challenging in the GOG than in the Mediterranean, due to the former’s limited maritime domain awareness, capacity, and capabilities. A major reason for that lack, in turn, is an absence of political will at the national level. In an effort to cultivate political will for maritime safety and security, CNE-C6F initiated a series of high-level regional flag officer visits, workshops, and symposiums. The first event was the 2006 Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Workshop mentioned above. This workshop brought together eighty African, American, and European officials and officers to discuss and analyze maritime security challenges in the region. The Accra workshop was used to generate interest in and set the stage for a ministerial conference.

That ministerial conference, held in November 2006 in Cotonou, Benin, brought together government ministers, high-ranking naval officers, and members of the IGO and NGO communities to discuss maritime threats and challenges, maritime domain awareness, regional approaches to cooperation, legal and regulatory regimes, public

awareness, and political will. The final products of the conference, the *Communiqué of the Gulf of Guinea and Action Plan for Communiqué*, reflect the priorities, experiences, and needs of GOG states. They were a clear expression of the determination of the attending ministers and government representatives to work together to improve maritime governance in the region. The action plan laid out six major objectives, as well as timing and required actions.⁴²

The purpose of this conference and the diplomatic activities leading up to it were to raise awareness among key institutions and policy makers in Gulf of Guinea countries of the importance of the maritime domain to the economic development and stability of the region, which would in turn lead to greater political will for action and ultimately generate maritime safety and security capacity and capabilities. Whether GOG leaders develop the political will to work together on strategies, plans, and maritime capabilities is an open question; however, it appears the objective of raising awareness has been at least partially met.

The Accra workshop and Cotonou Ministerial Conference were both considered successful in that the outputs were not driven by the United States or its European partners but by the GOG participants. CNE-C6F and its partners acted as facilitators and consultants. They provided a framework, not a solution; they helped their regional partners develop their own solution, based on local circumstances. An additional example of this approach has occurred in Ghana. CNE-C6F planners have been consulting with Ghanaian officials on their country's new national strategy for maritime security, helping the Ghanaians use their own information and ideas to craft a strategy themselves. The bilateral engagement strategy used in Ghana is consistent with CNE-C6F's overall approach to the region. It attempts to generate maritime safety and security by taking a top-down view, based on the belief that the GOG's political ills are such that success is not possible unless senior leadership buys into the process. This approach is different from the one pursued in the Mediterranean; there the approach is much less top down.

To go beyond awareness of maritime challenges and the development of limited capacity, CNE-C6F is attempting two initiatives in the Gulf. The first, the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS), also being used in the Mediterranean, is a multilateral, unclassified, maritime domain awareness (MDA) network developed with the assistance of the Department of Transportation's Volpe Center. The goal of the MSSIS is to create a comprehensive operational picture by integrating data from vessels equipped with the Automated Identification System (AIS) and other commercial data streams into American, NATO, and partner C4I* systems.⁴³ MSSIS was allocated \$2.6

* Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.

million in fiscal year 2006 for twenty-one African states. The first GOG countries participating in MSSIS are Ghana, São Tomé and Principe.

The second initiative, the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC), is a joint capability technology demonstration (JCTD) initiated in 2006, designed to enable select nations in the Gulf to develop MDA in regional waters and share their data with each other and with the United States. Nigeria and the island nation of São Tomé and Principe will be the first countries to receive training, sensors, and processors under this JCTD. Site surveys and additional system installations are planned for the remainder of fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2008, an additional \$540,000 is planned to support a site survey in Nigeria.

A subordinate concept CNE-C6F has developed for the GOG is the Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept. A GFS is an instrument used to carry out theater security cooperation activities and to build relationships; the concept is an outgrowth of the realization that building partner capacity requires a sustained presence that brief ship visits cannot provide. When the first GFS arrives in the Gulf of Guinea in late 2007, it will have an international staff embarked and stay in the Gulf for approximately six months, making regular port calls in the region in a continuous loop. It will provide training to GOG nations based on their requests.

In the past, when CNE-C6F sent ships to the GOG for extended periods of time, the advance planning that governed their deployments was largely developed by the CNE-C6F staff itself. With the Global Fleet Station, this is no longer the case. The GFS staff started advance planning by asking Gulf states and other partners what they would like the GFS to do, based on their needs and objectives. By making GFS advance planning a TSC activity, the staff is attempting to generate local consensus and serve local needs, an effort that will enhance American legitimacy in the region.

Leveraging existing partnerships and building new ones with key European states, IGOs, NGOs, and the interagency realm is the last major shaping tool utilized in the GOG. The primary European states involved in TSC activities with CNE-C6F are the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Portugal. So far they have attended workshops and conferences and provided observers. They are expected to provide liaison officers and trainers on the first GFS. France too conducts bilateral TSC activities (ship visits, training exercises, maritime protection activities, etc.) with countries in the region. The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Norway have recently expressed interest in participating in theater security cooperation with CNE-C6F.

IGOs and NGOs have been limited in cooperation and participation with CNE-C6F. The active participation of the International Maritime Organization and the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa in the Accra workshop and Cotonou

conference helped give legitimacy to CNE-C6F's awareness-building effort by showing Gulf officials that CNE-C6F's ideas on how to deal with maritime challenges are familiar. Other recent outreach attempts with IGOs and NGOs, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and InterAction (the largest alliance of U.S.-based international development and humanitarian NGOs), have been less successful, due to unfamiliarity with and concern over the U.S. military's motives. This same problem also exists with some of CNE-C6F's interagency partners. With both groups, CNE-C6F is still in the relationship-building phase, working to improve its understanding of what other maritime partners are working on in the Gulf of Guinea and how their activities might support broader assistance initiatives.

The last set of actors CNE-C6F has been partnering with to support its TSC efforts has been U.S. Navy reserve personnel through the Maritime Partnership Program (MPP). Since there is little or no full-time maritime experience within American embassies in the Gulf (the only naval attaché in the GOG is in Ghana, and there are no U.S. Navy personnel in any of the GOG offices of defense cooperation), MPP reservists have proved to be an effective short-term way to support theater security cooperation.⁴⁴

Implications for the Future

Shaping operations will continue to be central to CNE-C6F's strategy to generate a culture of maritime safety and security in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. Leveraging NATO and other existing security frameworks to build partner capacity and capability will remain a central pillar of the strategy. As cooperation matures among NATO, the European Union, and other Mediterranean partners, information sharing and maritime domain awareness can be expected to become norms in the Mediterranean. This should enable CNE-C6F and its partners to continue to deter, preempt, interdict, and respond to maritime threats over the next five to ten years.

Similar capabilities will take longer to mature in the Gulf. The low starting point of shaping operations and weak regional organizations, combined with weak national governance and limited resources, means the ways employed in the Mediterranean may not always be applicable in the GOG. Top-down approaches that focus on helping individual nations create national maritime safety and security strategies to share with others may be the best way for CNE-C6F to generate the political will needed to achieve objectives over the short term. The command will also seek to follow through on the Cotonou Plan of Action and build regional ownership in the plan's objectives. Lastly, unless political will and local ownership are created, CNE-C6F should limit the material assets provided to GOG states; without the will, assets will eventually deteriorate.

The shaping operations that CNE-C6F conducts are based on the premise that a safe and secure maritime domain will help nations and regions achieve stability and economic development. This is undoubtedly true, but as EUCOM and CNE-C6F acknowledge, underlying problems ashore, if not solved, may prevent long-term success.⁴⁵ Maritime insecurity is a direct reflection of problems ashore. Security cooperation planners must keep this in mind and find a way to bridge the gap between fostering development ashore and maritime initiatives. Achieving better unity of effort across the interagency and with regional organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and partnering countries is central to this endeavor. This is a fairly difficult task. Considerable distrust of the U.S. military's motives exists among many current and potential partners. To overcome it, CNE-C6F staff members have learned to be good listeners and focus on partner needs first. Dictating preconceived solutions is an ineffective way to build sustained long-term cooperation and partner capacity. This applies to interagency partners as well.

A significant implication is that theater security cooperation and other shaping operations require the military and interagency to develop a new and different portfolio of strategies and capabilities. Resources will need to be realigned in order to allow the military and interagency to develop the skills to link insecurity and development. Military personnel will find advanced training and degrees in agriculture, fisheries and environmental management, languages, and the social sciences of great use. Tours of duty may need to be lengthened from two or three years to four or more. As CNE-C6F conducts more shaping operations, especially in Africa, more robust interagency manning will become essential. The military can help set the conditions for development, but it is essential that international, nongovernmental, and development agencies be involved as well. To date, they are lagging.

Another implication is the importance of cooperation within the U.S. interagency. The shaping operations of Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet require interagency coordination and the alignment of objectives and resources with needs. Security and development initiatives need to link the sea and land domains. Security standards, port and road improvements, and agricultural and economic development programs are interrelated. While some alignment does occur at the national level in Washington, more is needed in theater at the operational level.⁴⁶

If maritime security, as Admiral Ulrich likes to say, is all about building a better network and as many partnerships as possible, the solutions lie in security cooperation. Shaping in this context is about advancing American interests by building awareness, partner capabilities, partnerships, and the ability to influence events through greater trust and transparency.

Notes

Portions of this chapter have also appeared in Alan Boyer, "Naval Response to a Changed Security Environment: Maritime Security in the Mediterranean," *Naval War College Review*, forthcoming in Summer 2007.

1. Epigraph from Admiral Harry G. Ulrich, Commander, *U.S. Naval Forces Europe Guidance for 2007*, 5 January 2007, p. 3.
2. The Gulf of Guinea is defined as the eleven coastal and island states from Ghana to Angola.
3. Ulrich, *U.S. Naval Forces Europe Guidance for 2007*, p. 1.
4. General James L. Jones, Commander, U.S. European Command, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 1 March 2005, p. 3.
5. U.S. Naval Forces Europe Public Affairs, "Maritime Safety, Security Conference Set for Benin," available at www.c6f.navy.mil/.
6. In February and August 2001, al-Qa'ida operatives were found by Italian authorities on board two Tongan-flagged vessels. In May and June 2002, Morocco captured three Saudi men—led by Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasher, Osama Bin Laden's former chief of maritime operations—who were actively plotting suicide attacks against U.S. and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar. Al-Nasher was captured in Yemen in November 2002. He has reportedly admitted playing a key role in organizing the attacks on the USS *Cole* and M/V *Limburg*. U.S. Justice Dept., statement, "Al Qaeda Associates Charged in Attack on USS *Cole*, Attempted Attack on Another U.S. Naval Vessel," available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/; and Christopher Dickey, "High-Seas Terrorism," *Newsweek*, 27 January 2003, p. 8.
7. Author interview.
8. Armed groups include "insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal groups. These armed groups are characterized by their ability and willingness to challenge the authority and legitimacy of states and even the international system, and they can attack within and across state boundaries, and even globally." Andrea J. Dew, "Irregular Warfare, Armed Groups, and the Long War: A New Analytical Framework," in *Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st* Century, ed. Richard M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Paper 2 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2006), p. 104.
9. Michael F. Morris and Charles Edel, "Nigeria," in *Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism*, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (New York: Routledge, 2006).
10. International Crisis Group, "Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis," *Africa Report N°118*, 28 September 2006, p. 1.
11. General James L. Jones, Commander U.S. European Command, *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 7 March 2006, p. 8.
12. Of 325 million people who transited through European ports in 2001, 7.3 million came from non-European ports. About 2.8 million passengers pass through Spain's North African ports of Ceuta and Melilla every year. Council of Europe, *Feasibility Study of the European Union's Maritime Borders* (Brussels: Project 114410, September 2003), p. 4.
13. In 2003, more than 650 vessels were intercepted with illegal immigrants by Spain. Council of Europe, *Organized Crime Situation Report 2005* (Strasbourg, Fr.: Department of Crime Problems, December 2005), p. 39.
14. Ibid.
15. Ali M. Koknar, "Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO," *Energy Focus*, 24 January 2005, available at www.iags.org/n0124051.htm; Luke Baker, "Italy Study Sees Al Qaeda Link to Human Trafficking," *Reuters*, 7 August 2003.
16. Author interview.
17. Office on Drugs and Crime, *2005 World Drug Report* (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 128.
18. International Narcotics Control Board, *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2005* (New York: United Nations, 2006), p. 45.
19. Since 1997 Albania has had a flourishing weapons trade. In that year hundreds of thousands of weapons were looted from government stockpiles during riots arising from anti-government protests. Over 300,000 weapons and 700 million rounds of ammunition are still unaccounted for. Center for Peace and Disarmament Education and Saferworld, *Turning*

the Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania (London: December 2005), p. 7, available at www.saferworld.org.uk/.

20. "Maritime Security Policy," in *National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 21 December 2004), p. 4.

21. Raymond Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 1 (January 2007), available at www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jan/gilpinJan07.asp.

22. Marine Resources Assessment Group, Ltd., *Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries* (London: Department for International Development, 2005), p. 45.

23. International Chamber of Commerce, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships* (Barking, Essex, U.K.: International Maritime Bureau, January 2007), p. 18.

24. International Crisis Group, "Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis," p. 8.

25. Margie Gibson, "New Model of Security Emphasizes Partnership, Cooperation," *Defenselink News*, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/.

26. Worldwide seaborne trade increased 272 percent between 1970 and 2005. United Nations, *Review of Maritime Transport 2006* (Geneva: Conference on Trade and Development, 2006), p. 18.

27. Individual country scores are available at web.worldbank.org/.

28. During the Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Workshop in Accra, Ghanaian participants identified the critical necessity of building political will in support of effective action. U.S. European Command, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, *Program Highlights, Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Workshop*, Accra, Ghana, 19–22 March 2006, p. 3.

29. *Green Paper: Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union—a European Vision for the Oceans and Seas* (Brussels: Commission of European Communities, 7 June 2006), available at ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/com_2006_0275_en_part2.pdf; *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2005).

30. Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea"; and U.S. European Command, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Department of State and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, *Program Highlights, Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea* Ministerial Conference, Cotonou, Benin, 13–15 November 2006, p. 23.

31. "Maritime Security Policy," in *National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2004, p. 2.

32. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Defense Dept., 2005), p. i; and Jendayi Frazer, keynote address, Maritime Safety and Security—Gulf of Guinea Ministerial Conference, Cotonou, Benin, available at www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2006/77336.htm.

33. *National Defense Strategy of the United States*, p. i; *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, p. 9; and *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Defense Dept., 2004), p. 2.

34. General James L. Jones Commander, USMC, United States European Command, Statement before the Committee on Senate Armed Services, p. 5, 7 March 2006, available at armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/March/, p. 5.

35. U.S. European Command, "EUCOM Maritime Security Strategy for Africa," 19 January 2006, p. 2.

36. U.S. European Command et al., *Program Highlights*, 19–22 March 2006; Admiral Henry "Harry" G. Ulrich III, Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples, and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, keynote address, p. 15.

37. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO. It allows partner countries to build up individual relationships with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. PfP was launched in 1994; currently twenty countries participate. "Partnership for Peace," *NATO Topics*, www.nato.int/issues/pfp/. Mediterranean Dialogue partners include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

38. Article V states that an armed attack against one or more of member-states in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Article V, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949, available at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

39. Roberto Cesaretti, "Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean," *NATO Review* (Autumn 2005), available at www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art4.html.

40. It was not the original purpose of OAE to conduct search-and-rescue, humanitarian, or disaster-relief operations; the ability to do so is an unexpected benefit. An example occurred on 4 December 2001, when the Standing Task Force Mediterranean ships *Aliseo*, *Formion*, and *Elrod* were called to assist in the rescue of eighty-four civilians from a stricken oil rig in high winds and heavy seas. *Aliseo*'s embarked helicopter removed all eighty-four in fourteen flights. NATO ships have also been involved in the countering of illegal immigration. On 23 March 2006, OAE ships on counterterrorist patrol in the Mediterranean spotted suspicious movement on the M/V *Crystal* and began tracking the vessel. They notified the Hellenic Coast Guard, which intercepted the vessel as it approached Greek waters. Greek authorities boarded the vessel and subsequently arrested the captain, crew, and 126 illegal immigrants.

41. Cem Gürdeniz, "Transformation in the Black Sea and Caucasus Regions," speech to the Third Annual Security Conference: Security Risks and Transformation—Euro-Atlantic and Regional Perspectives, Center for the Study of Democracy, 19 November 2005, available at www.csd.bg/. The Black Sea Group of the Navy Forces partnership was created by a 2000 treaty between Turkey and other states of the region. Its tasks were search and rescue, humanitarian assistance operations, mine countermeasures, environmental protection operations, goodwill visits, and other tasks, like peace support operations, agreed to by all parties.

42. The objectives are to improve maritime domain awareness, strengthen regulatory frameworks, enhance regional cooperation, raise public awareness, engage partners, and strengthen political will. The *Communiqué of the Gulf of Guinea and Action Plan for Communiqué* are available at www.c6f.navy.mil.

43. Recent successes include live transmission of data from a cell phone in Egypt and the direct feed of AIS data from a submarine under way.

44. Author interview.

45. U.S. European Command, "EUCOM Maritime Security Strategy for Africa," p. 4.

46. U.S. European Command et al., *Program Highlights*, 13–15 November 2006, pp. 18–19.

Building Partners' Capacity

The Thousand-Ship Navy

RONALD E. RATCLIFF

That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill.

ARISTOTLE, *POLITICS*

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world's maritime nations to raise what he called a "thousand-ship navy" to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that "the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security."¹ He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:

Because today's challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity.

As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.²

Nearly two years after the bold proposal for a multinational maritime force, little progress seems to have been made in constituting this "navy-in-being." This article argues

that the thousand-ship navy, now more generally referred to within the U.S. Navy as the “Global Maritime Network,” or “Partnership,” is an idea well worth pursuing. But the Navy is struggling (perhaps even failing) to build support for it, for three reasons. First, it has not invested sufficient resources—monetary, administrative, or intellectual—to achieve the important goals articulated. Second, the Navy does not appear to appreciate fully the nature of the challenges it faces in overcoming the global maritime manifestation of the classic “tragedy of the commons” (which will be discussed below). Third, despite its rhetoric, the service has not made the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership (TSN/GMP) a part of its current maritime strategy, which raises doubts as to whether such a concept will be incorporated in the new strategy currently being written. The absence of any mention of the thousand-ship navy in Admiral Mullen’s May 2007 testimony before Congress on the status and future of the service seems to belie the importance he has given it in forums involving the international naval community.³ The lack of such official support for the TSN/GMP has likely been interpreted by nations reluctant to participate as a sign of weakness in American commitment to the concept.

This article will present its argument in three parts. The first will address the goals and objectives of the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership that have been communicated in such unofficial venues as the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* and *Navy Times*. The second part will examine the challenges the U.S. Navy faces in convincing the rest of the world to expend limited resources on an international navy. The third will identify specific steps and initiatives that need to be given serious consideration if the potential and goals of the concept are to be realized. Unless the U.S. Navy is willing to move beyond the public-relations program that now seems to substitute for serious commitment, this bold concept risks becoming the maritime equivalent of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations—that is, it will die, and not because it was a bad idea but because the country that proposed it was not committed to it.

A Global Maritime Security Network

The rationale for the TSN has largely been seen within the U.S. Navy as emanating from increased international maritime traffic due to globalization. In late 2005, Navy officials asserted, “Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime commons is a key element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation’s long-term economic well-being. . . . Policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all nations interested in economic prosperity and security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain.”⁴

The service has used a series of magazine articles and speeches by various senior officers, including Admiral Mullen, to explain and build support for the thousand-ship navy. The

TSN/GMP is envisioned as an international maritime force, an aggregation of maritime entities, not just of the world's navies. It would also include the world's coast guards, sea-borne shipping enterprises (shipping lines, port facilities, and other maritime-related entities), and various governmental agencies and nongovernmental bodies. In an effort to head off concerns about sovereignty, the Navy has attempted to make clear that participation would be strictly on a voluntary basis and that the goal is simply to meet the "compelling need" that has emerged "for a global maritime security network, a 'Navy of Navies,' to protect the maritime domain and to ensure the lifeblood of globalization—trade—flows freely and unencumbered."⁵ Ten guiding principles have been established in these public writings and statements for the "Navy of Navies":⁶

- National *sovereignty* would always be respected.
- Nations, navies, and maritime forces would participate where and when they have *common interests*.
- The focus would be solely on security in the *maritime* domain: ports, harbors, territorial waters, maritime approaches, the high seas, and international straits, as well as the numerous exploitable seams between them.
- While no nation can do everything, *all nations could contribute something* of value.
- The TSN/GMP would be a *network* of international navies, coast guards, maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and local law enforcement, all working together.
- Nations or navies having the capacity would be expected to *help less capable ones* increase their ability to provide maritime security in their own ports, harbors, territorial waters, and approaches.
- Nations or navies that need assistance *would have to ask for it*.
- Each geographic region would develop *regional maritime networks*.
- To be effective and efficient, the Global Maritime Partnership would have to *share information widely*; classified maritime intelligence would be kept to a minimum.
- This would be a long-term effort, but the security of the maritime domain demands that it *start now*.

To operationalize the concept, the U.S. Navy identified two objectives it considers critical to protecting the world's waterways and facilitating the free flow of trade among nations: increased "maritime domain awareness," through greater collaboration and transfer of information among nations about anything maritime, and positioning of maritime assets so as to be able to respond to crises or emergencies. The Navy views the TSN/GMP as fundamentally a means of sharing responsibility for maritime security—

“importing it into regions where it is lacking and exporting it from regions that have the capability and desire to do so.”⁷ Proponents argue that the concept is already, to some extent, in being; they regularly point to instances where navies have coordinated operations on an ad hoc basis to achieve necessary and worthwhile goals. Among the most cited are Task Force 150, which operates in and around the Saudi Arabian Peninsula; the Indonesian tsunami-relief effort of late 2004 and 2005; and the Straits of Malacca counterpiracy agreement, known as MALSINDO, between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Yet despite such efforts to “sell” the idea of a thousand-ship navy, in late 2006 Admiral Mullen felt obliged to seek active support for it at two international maritime conferences. At the Mediterranean Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice and at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Pearl Harbor, he told his contemporaries that it was time to “move beyond dialogue” and to “take tangible steps” that would “put these powerful ideas to work at sea.”⁸ He argued three compelling reasons for moving faster to constitute the Global Maritime Partnership. First, the pace of globalization is raising the stakes for security in the maritime domain, where 90 percent of the world’s trade passes from production to market; second, globalization has brought, along with its benefits, new vulnerabilities as well, particularly to “ideologues, pirates, proliferators, criminals, and terrorists” who not only are likely to target maritime regions but are “innovative, smart and determined, and [able to] often act—and react—faster than many of our traditional governing bodies.”⁹ Third, Admiral Mullen suggested, rapid advances in technology and information technology can significantly facilitate multinational naval operations, but only if nations take advantage of them.

Important as these points are, however, perhaps better explicating the way ahead and accenting the tangible steps the U.S. Navy has already taken to make the concept a reality would make a stronger argument for it. Also, and though the Navy has made clear that it has no desire to dictate the terms of participation, it must provide leadership in the form of action to draw in other navies. Specifically, the Navy would gain greater purchase among the world’s maritime entities by acquiring, employing, and sharing the necessary information and communications technologies than by merely highlighting the possibilities they offer. Operations at sea cannot take place without the means to coordinate the actions of participating units, and they cannot succeed without current and actionable intelligence. Until the Navy can explain or demonstrate how both functions will be accomplished in the TSN/GMP, it should expect only tepid responses from potential participants.

Today, on the eve of the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, two years after the thousand-ship navy concept was introduced, it is becoming increasingly apparent

that the concept has yet to gain widespread support among the world's maritime enterprises. Despite the success of combined naval operations in highly publicized operations that averted or relieved major human disasters around the world, many countries remain cautious about "joining" or being seen as advocates of the Global Maritime Partnership. However logical and benign the thousand-ship navy seems to the United States, other countries remain openly wary of its intended purposes and possible unintended consequences. They have legitimate concerns, and if the U.S. Navy is to constitute a thousand-ship navy it must address them forthrightly. That challenge is not inconsequential. Hyperbole and rhetorical calls to act for the greater good of a globalizing world will not be sufficient. Indeed, if the logic of the TSN/GMP has clear appeal to many nations, the concept also has weaknesses that if not resolved will likely prove fatal.

"The Tragedy of the (Maritime) Commons"

Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

GARRET HARDIN

The "maritime commons" comprise seas and waterways either beyond sovereign control of any nation or under the shared sovereignty of two or more. With no single guarantor of their security and well-being, they are attractive for illicit activities. Since September 2001 the U.S. Navy has become particularly concerned about these areas and has called for greater scrutiny over and the "policing and protecting" of those where the collective economic prosperity of the world's trading nations might be threatened.¹⁰

As Admiral Mullen has declared, the expansive maritime commons and the wide range of threats that exist there are beyond the capacity of any navy, including that of the United States, to police or control. The nature of those threats, however, is not self-evident, nor is their urgency commonly acknowledged. Among the reasons for this, one of the most important is that the benefits that accrue from the maritime commons are not equally shared. Where the United States sees in the maritime common the free flow of commerce, many other states are forced to live with entirely different circumstances. For major trading nations like the United States the concern with respect to the maritime commons is a disruption in shipping, which would cause significant perturbations in the world's economy. Arguably, however, those effects would be brief and quickly overcome. The problems that many other nations face in the maritime commons, however, are not potential but present, not episodic but long term, and they affect "human" security more than national or economic security. These challenges include waterborne pandemics,

maritime crime and piracy, the misuse of ocean resources, and the smuggling of contraband goods, people, and drugs. These challenges are largely regional; they do not threaten the global village but constitute a menace to the well-being of local populations.

Thus the “tragedy of the *maritime commons*”—notwithstanding assertions that everyone benefits from the security of the maritime commons, nations benefit so unequally that many see no reason to contribute to it.¹¹ Many nations that lie near or astride important parts of the maritime commons but do not benefit significantly from world trade are hard pressed to justify spending their limited resources to help the world’s wealthiest countries get richer. The U.S. Navy’s seeming lack of appreciation for these differing equities may account for much of its inability to generate enthusiasm.

This raises an important challenge for the combatant commands—building capacity for partnership through security cooperation. If the Navy is to nurture an international global maritime network of entities that contribute to the maritime domain, it must move past a rhetoric focused on a threat to world trade. It must find ways to make the thousand-ship navy a solution to a wider set of problems.

International Doubt and Reticence

Much of the contemporary naval literature refers to providing for or protecting the “global maritime commons” as if it were a self-evident good. But as we have seen, the reality is that individuals usually only act when it benefits them directly. Aristotle, in the passage quoted above, is likely the first to warn against assuming too much collective good will as being the natural order of things.¹² During the Peloponnesian War, in the fifth century BC, the Athenians made the point harshly to envoys of the Aegean island of Melos (as reported by Thucydides): “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹³

Neither are the navies of the world equals; the U.S. Navy is, and will likely remain for some time to come, completely and absolutely dominant wherever and whenever it chooses to operate. Admiral Mullen’s predecessor, Admiral Vern Clark, bluntly stated what most in the service believe, that the U.S. Navy would and should “operate from the maritime domain anywhere, anytime, without a permission slip.” While the ramifications of American combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this article, it seems apparent that American willingness to “go it alone” gives many nations reasons for reluctance to join a potentially encumbering, if ad hoc and voluntary, arrangement like the Global Maritime Partnership.

Asian Concerns

India, for example, has been quite candid in its assessment of American interest in the global maritime domain. A recent article in an influential Indian national security publication seems to capture a broadly held sentiment about American intentions.

Among the foremost security concerns of the nation after 9/11 is the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists on its territory and their proliferation through inimical states. The global reach of the predominantly maritime threat and the “overstretch” of the US Navy have led to the initiation of a series of American initiatives like Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), all aimed at mobilizing global support to secure the US “homeland.”

A “Thousand-ship Navy” (TSN) is another novel concept; recently defined . . . as “a global maritime partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns.” . . . The TSN is thus shown as a benign initiative, aimed at obtaining the co-operation of “friendly navies.”¹⁴

The implication here is that the TSN/GMP is largely an attempt by the United States to secure its homeland while avoiding the controversial aspects of the programs listed above and the legitimate concerns they have generated for national sovereignty. That said, the Indians have also noted, pragmatically, that their nation has much to gain: it would gain access to the U.S. intelligence grid; information sharing would neither impinge on India’s sovereignty nor conflict with international law; and participation would provide India politico-diplomatic goodwill, since it is unlikely that it will formally join the Proliferation Security Initiative, at least in the near term.¹⁵

Possibly more surprising has been the assessment by Australian and other Asia-Pacific security analysts that the TSN/GMP is not feasible in Asia because of differing maritime security strategies, divergent perceptions of the maritime threat, and long-standing and unresolved territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea.¹⁶ In this view, China is an impediment to the thousand-ship navy, because of its support of regional maritime projects and agreements that the United States and its principal Asian ally, Japan, have refused to join.¹⁷ Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Straits of Malacca, where the U.S.-sponsored RMSI has drawn heavy criticism from Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Singapore.¹⁸ China, in contrast, has gained extensive diplomatic leverage by calls for nonintervention by other navies in the straits and by financial support of local maritime initiatives. Chinese relations with Taiwan impede some navies from participation in the TSN/GMP. Japan and Korea, however, are strong proponents of the concept, which adds another complication to its implementation because it puts them at odds with China.

China's own strategic calculus and security strategy vis-à-vis the United States are works in progress. Recently, Jerry M. Hultin, former Under Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of U.S. Pacific Command, wrote,

As China's own naval power grows, it will need to fashion a naval policy within a national security policy that supports its own interests. It can cooperate with the United States by coordinating naval strategy and deployments, as do many of America's current allies; it can fashion its own separate strategy, seeking to compete with or displace American strategy, or it can pursue a mixed strategy, combining elements of both approaches.

For its part, the United States will need to make adjustments in its policies and strategies as Chinese military power grows.¹⁹

While the potential exists for the United States to make room for China and other problematic countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, to join the thousand-ship navy, mutual distrust will make it difficult to argue that "everybody is welcome." In point of fact, not everyone is welcome, and the criteria that define "like-minded" interests have yet to be clearly delineated. Yet Russian naval participation in NATO's Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR may provide a model for how countries with competing national interests can participate constructively in the TSN/GMP.

The principles and the goals of the thousand-ship navy are nearly synonymous with those of the *U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security*. The latter is based on three broad tenets: preserving the freedom of the seas, which includes the right of innocent and transit passage and access to the world's ports; facilitating and defending the free flow of maritime commerce; and promoting the movement of desirable goods and people across borders while screening out dangerous people and goods.²⁰ The similarity in terms and concepts is not lost on those who must decide whether to participate in the Global Maritime Partnership and then justify their choices to domestic authorities who critically examine the cost and kinds of operations their naval forces conduct. Unless compelling reasons can be found that link participation directly to local security, few naval forces will be willing to join, even briefly.

Contentious Objectives and Chronic Problems

As noted earlier, increased maritime security involves two primary objectives: an effective level of maritime domain awareness must be established, and naval forces must be in the right places at the right times. Both present considerable operational and administrative challenges.

The level of maritime domain awareness necessary to disrupt or eliminate illicit enterprises requires information and intelligence analysis on a massive scale. Information is available in many disparate and potentially valuable forms, such as invoices on maritime cargo, shipping companies, port activity, insurance assessments, fishery area control and

management schemes, naval and national intelligence, and countless others. While the TSN/GMP is envisioned as comprising regional maritime networks, the questions of whom these networks would involve, where they would be, and how they would collect, process, and disseminate information are all yet to be resolved. Three exemplars are cited as steps in the right direction: the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center in the Mediterranean, the Malacca Strait Patrol Agreement, and Task Force 150, in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz. These efforts have shown the potential of coordinated maritime operations, yet they have also made clear the substantial problems that arise when critical information is classified by a nation. As the U.S.-led counterdrug operations in the Caribbean have shown conclusively, actionable intelligence is the single most important prerequisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea.²¹

Putting maritime assets in the right location is equally problematic. Most nations do not have the resources to sustain units where they can be most effective. Often, activity of the kind that the Global Maritime Partnership is intended to combat occurs in the waters of the world's poorest nations; their navies find the distances involved too great, but national sensitivity over sovereignty often precludes them from asking for help. In this sense national pride is an impediment to greater cooperation among the world's navies, even in a framework as flexible, informal, and ad hoc as the thousand-ship navy. Additionally, the rules of engagement that govern the actions of each navy begin with national rules and regulations and so may be at odds with the wishes and desires of the United States and its vision for the TSN/GMP. The experience of U.S. intervention efforts in the Western Hemisphere provides numerous examples of conflicting national priorities and perceptions of the issues leading to less than optimal results.²²

Among the critical challenges, then, that confront successful implementation of the Global Maritime Partnership, four stand out. The first is building trust. Long-held animosities, suspicions of other nations' intentions, and the general secrecy that surrounds national security plans affect relations among some of the most important potential contributors to the thousand-ship navy. The list is large—India and Pakistan, China and India, Japan and China, Korea and Japan, Australia and Asia, Southeast Asia and China, Chile and Argentina, and Venezuela and the United States, to name a few—and the issues complicated and often intense. The second challenge concerns capability and capacity. Many navies and coast guards find it difficult to act even when in a position to do so. Most countries' navies are more akin to coast guards. Ships and craft suited for customs and border patrol or for monitoring fisheries and economic exclusion zones are not well suited to dealing with terrorists or proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, the carrier-centric U.S. Navy is ill suited to operations in the littorals.

A third issue involves jurisprudence. Domestic and international law governing conduct on the seas is notoriously vague and complex, which complicates the actions of forces operating within a construct like the Global Maritime Partnership. Individual navies or commanders willing to act consistently with the intent of the TSN/GMP may be overruled by sovereign authorities because of the vagaries of the law. Problems of this sort already impede the kind of cooperation envisioned by the TSN/GMP, and there would be no mechanism within the partnership to resolve them. Finally, there is the issue of communications. While new communications technologies offer many channels, “common operating pictures” and maritime domain awareness require more than Web portals and radio circuits. An operational picture at sea is fluid, and a lapse of information flow for even a few hours can destroy any chance for coordinated or purposeful action.

Nothing in this list is new, but the world’s navies have yet to find ways to resolve them. The Global Maritime Partnership is attractive for that very reason to many nations that have been frustrated by other attempts and see in the TSN/GMP at least a promising start. Concrete action and active dialogue, however, must replace rhetoric and pleas for greater commitment on the part of others. If the thousand-ship navy is to survive and grow, the U.S. Navy will need to take a stronger role in constituting a “navy in being,” in a way that does not alarm or put off potential participants. It must be more a catalyst than a leader.

Time for Commitment

Long a purpose-built “blue water” fleet, the U.S. Navy continues to struggle mightily to transform itself into a force that can meet the operational challenges of littoral waters.²³ Moreover, the inability of the Navy, or of its joint and interagency partners, to secure the strategic approaches to the United States against drug traffickers despite nearly twenty years of intensive effort speaks starkly to the magnitude of taking on the global maritime commons. Still, the thousand-ship navy makes sense, and for the reasons Admiral Mullen identified in 2005. But unless the U.S. Navy shows commitment to the Global Maritime Partnership by programs and initiatives that directly support it, navies that have not yet signed on are unlikely to do so any time soon.

The U.S. Navy can and should consider seriously a number of steps in order to revive enthusiasm for the thousand-ship navy. The first is to *make it an important element of the forthcoming maritime strategy*. Seapower in the twenty-first century is unique in history. Where once fleet power was determined by the amalgamation of large numbers of capital ships and their escorts, modern weapons make such assemblages dangerous and impracticable. In any case, the world’s nations have demonstrated a growing unease about, if not downright unwillingness to follow, American-conceived and -led

military operations. A clear and unambiguous statement of commitment to the Global Maritime Partnership in the maritime strategy now being formulated would signal to the world's navies that the U.S. Navy is serious about a global approach to protecting the maritime commons.

Provide clearer guidance about the structure of the TSN/GMP. One of the advantages of the concept is its ad hoc nature, a “come as you are, when you can” approach that frees navies from formal agreements or binding obligations. This is also, unfortunately, one of its greatest weaknesses. Without greater specificity about operating procedures, command relationships, and basic rules of engagement, navies are hard pressed to explain or justify their commitment to their national leaderships. There are several rudimentary steps that the U.S. Navy and committed partners can take to eliminate the less beneficial elements of “ad-hocracy.” One would be establishing a basic command structure dividing the maritime commons into defined operating areas and assigning nominal leadership roles for regional powers. Another would be to delineate a basic set of rules of engagement addressing obvious and necessary restraints and constraints. A third would be linking the TSN/GMP with existing organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and with the antipiracy centers being established in various parts of the world.

Third, forget GFS and embrace TSN/GMP-FS. Part of the current Navy strategy is to construct and deploy “Global Fleet Station” (GFS) ships to support the ships of the U.S. Navy and regional partners in a variety of maritime and littoral operations. These ships and the operational ideas behind them show how the Global Maritime Partnership could work and could serve as fleet experiments to identify operational and administrative problems and facilitate international solutions. A group of dedicated TSN/GMP–Fleet Station ships, under the administrative control of current U.S. maritime component commanders, could be deployed to show Navy commitment to the concept and entice other nations to participate. These platforms could be used as test beds to experiment with command-and-control procedures using common communications equipment and operating concepts.

Make the U.S. Coast Guard a major element of the thousand-ship navy. Few navies have, like the U.S. Navy, the sole purpose of warfighting. Most navies, as we have noted, are more like the Coast Guard, tasked with maritime law enforcement and stewardship of their countries' maritime resources. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that we are really speaking of the “thousand-ship coast guard.” Given the kinds of operations that are likely to occupy the Global Maritime Partnership, placing the Coast Guard at or near the vanguard has an indisputable logic. If the TSN/GMP is to be a network of all maritime-related organizations, not just an ad hoc collection of navies, the Coast

Guard seems to be the most logical agent to coordinate it. The Navy, then, needs to find the Coast Guard a prominent role in the development and growth of the concept and, relatedly, to consider how the Navy and Coast Guard could operate as a national force in American territorial waters as well as abroad.

Partners must be enabled to see the same operating picture the U.S. Navy does—allies and coalition partners have been telling the Navy that for years, and seemingly endless studies of communication, command, and control only confirm it. Until the U.S. Navy provides a portal through which its partners can tap into its information, it cannot expect them to contribute freely to it. Until the Navy can show that it will give as good as it gets, reluctant partners will continue to have a sound reason to resist meaningful participation.

Finally, if the U.S. Navy is to gain credibility and support for the TSN/GMP, it must take steps to support and leverage recent efforts by America's political leadership to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) within the next two years.²⁴ American objections have ranged from concerns about loss of national sovereignty to unease over access to important but often contentious seaways. The unwillingness of the United States to sign an agreement that almost all of the rest of the world has ratified makes advocacy for the TSN/GMP appear hypocritical. UNCLOS is not a perfect document, but such agreements rarely are, and America already purports to abide by its rules; formal ratification should be painless, and it would constitute a major step toward protecting the global maritime commons. The nation must demonstrate that it honors Admiral Mullen's statement that "acting in one's national interest" serves the global interest as well.²⁵

The thousand-ship navy is a concept whose time has come. The U.S. Navy can no longer protect the world's most important waterways alone. Still, the Navy's conception of the maritime commons as being a self-evident good must be modified both in word and in deed. Naval strategies and concepts do not stand in isolation from the particular issues and interests that dictate national security policies. Hence, the U.S. Navy must make clear its firm commitment to, and the benign intent of, the thousand-ship navy through concrete acts. The alternative is to lose the opportunity for an innovative and workable solution to an age-old problem—protecting the freedom of the seas in a time of great uncertainty and peril.

Notes

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1. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the Seventeenth International

Seapower Symposium, Newport, Rhode Island, 21 September 2005.

2. *Ibid.*
3. Statements of Adm. Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower, 3 May 2007, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 March 2007.
4. John Morgan, Jr. [Vice Adm., USN], and Charles Martoglio [Capt., USN], "The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 131 (November 2005), p. 14.
5. John Morgan, Jr. [Vice Adm., USN], "A Navy of Navies," *RUSI Defence Systems* (Summer 2006), p. 66.
6. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Future Maritime Warfare Conference, London, 13 December 2005.
7. Morgan and Martoglio, "The 1,000-Ship Navy," pp. 16–17.
8. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 31 October 2006.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Morgan and Martoglio, "The 1,000-Ship Navy," p. 14.
11. See Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* (1968), pp. 1243–48, for a full description of how the "commons" are generally treated and how self-interest overcomes more altruistic notions.
12. Aristotle's critique of Socrates in *Politics*, Book II, Part III, arises in his comments on Plato's *Republic*, wherein he objects to Socrates' description and advocacy of communal ownership as a "sign of perfect unity in a state," a condition that he calls impracticable.
13. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Dutton, 1910; repr. 1914), Book V, chap. 17, "The Melian Conference," p. 394. The translation by Rex Warner in 1954 (New York: Penguin) reads, somewhat more expressively: "The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact *the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept*" (p. 402).
14. Gurpreet S. Khurana, "'Thousand-Ship Navy': A Reincarnation of the Controversial P.S.I.?" *ISDA Commentary*, 28 December 2006.
15. Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Intrigued by 1,000-Ship Navy Idea," *DefenseNews.com*.
16. Wendell Minnick, Taipei, "U.S.-Led Proposal Won't Work for Most of Asia," *DefenseNews.com*.
17. *Ibid.*
18. For an overview of the RMSI see Admiral Tom Fargo's address to the Military Operations and Law Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, on 3 May 2004, available at www.pacom.mil/speeches/.
19. Jerry M. Hultin [Hon.] and Dennis Blair [Adm., USN (Ret.)], "Naval Power and Globalization: The Next Twenty Years in the Pacific," *Politique Americaine* (September 2006).
20. *United States National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House), March 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html.
21. For these issues in one important application, see Craig H. Allen, "The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 35–52.
22. For a detailed discussion of the problems that characterize U.S. government agency efforts to combat the flow of drugs into the United States, see *The Illicit Drug Transit Zone in Central America*, hearing and briefing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 9 November 2005, no. 109–139.
23. While such initiatives as naval expeditionary warfare forces have been fielded, the Navy's premier program for littoral operations, the Littoral Combat Ship, is in disarray; cost overruns threaten the future of that program. The Navy has yet to build support in Congress for its 313-ship fleet; the LCS episode threatens the Navy's credibility as to whether it can sustain a shipbuilding program to get to that number.
24. On 15 May 2007, President George W. Bush released a formal statement calling on the Senate to ratify UNCLOS.
25. See note 1, above.

Regional Security Initiative

Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa

STEPHEN A. EMERSON

Africa, with its fragile governments, abject poverty, and seemingly incessant political and social turmoil, is increasingly seen by the United States as the next major battleground in the global struggle against terrorism. Nowhere is this prospect more apparent today than in the greater Horn of Africa, where the U.S. military has been spearheading efforts to shape the regional security environment to counter the growth and spread of violent radical Islamists.¹ Utilizing an array of military, diplomatic, and civic-action tools, the U.S. Central Command is seeking aggressively to counter, and more importantly preempt, the terrorist threat in this strategic part of Africa. At the center of these efforts is the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the mission of which “is focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity.”² CJTF-HOA is an example of a regional security initiative that gives the United States a regional strike capability, military training capacity, and civic-action instrument that “is a creative, good-faith effort to shape the environment in a preventative manner.”³

Despite the many notable achievements in this part of Africa by the United States—and CJTF-HOA in particular—since 2002, the region remains a volatile mix of instability and unpredictability. Moreover, while the ability to alter the strategic landscape offers great potential security benefits to the United States in Africa, the Horn’s terribly unforgiving geopolitical environment poses even greater risks should Washington miscalculate. All too frequently, for example, Washington has opted, in its zeal to combat terrorism in the region, for short-term military gains at the expense of longer-term political and economic development objectives, undermining thereby its own prospects for building future regional peace and security. Failure to address adequately the underlying political and social dynamics of the Horn is the most serious challenge to the ultimate success of this regional security initiative.

The Security Environment: Old Animosities, New Challenges

The greater Horn of Africa has long been viewed as one of the most complex and deadliest security environments on the continent. An enduring legacy of bitter national and personal rivalries, divided societies, highly militarized regimes, and great-power involvement has made protracted conflict a hallmark of the region for the past forty years. As Ruth Iyob and Edmond Keller note, this spectrum of conflict runs the full gamut—from interstate competition for regional hegemony to localized struggles over the control of land, water, resources, and people.⁴ Since the mid-1960s, the greater Horn has witnessed two large-scale conventional wars; bitter, long-running internal conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda; and innumerable border clashes and proxy wars, altogether resulting in the deaths of millions of people and fueling massive population movements, famine, and starvation. Not surprisingly, the greater Horn is one of Africa’s poorest and least developed regions, characterized by extreme

MAP 1
Horn of Africa



political instability, unceasing violence, widespread poverty, and great human suffering. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Djibouti, in fact, rank in the bottom fifth of the most recent UN Human Development index.⁵

From the onset of the European scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century to the superpower rivalry of the Cold War, outside forces played major roles in defining the nature of regional conflict and in shaping the security environment. Arbitrarily drawn colonial borders, fragmented African societies, and a divide-and-rule strategy helped set the stage for future confrontations in and among the people and countries of the region. Though it ended nearly twenty years ago, the Cold War in Africa only served to reinforce this pattern of conflict by aggravating the spread of competing authoritarian regimes, militarization, proxy wars, and intervention in the domestic affairs of neighboring states. The result has been a lasting legacy of institutionalized violence, heightened lethality, and a struggle for regional dominance by multiple, competing centers of power, each of which sees the others as central threats to its very survival.⁶

In recent years, six powerful and mutually reinforcing events and trends have come effectively to define the region and its security problems:

- The collapse of the Somali state and ensuing rise of warlordism
- Eritrea's independence and its lingering border conflict with Ethiopia
- Chronic Sudanese internal instability
- The proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the associated rise of powerful nonstate actors
- Recurring natural disasters and humanitarian crises resulting in major population movements
- Globalization and the resulting internationalization of domestic and regional conflict.

Today's security environment in the Horn, according to John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen,⁷ can be described primarily in terms of two major conflict clusters—the interlocking rebellions in Sudan and its neighbors, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict (the latter, largely, as played out within the context of an internal Somali power struggle). Violence within Sudan's Darfur region has left as many as 450,000 dead and displaced another 2.5 million, while helping to worsen instability in neighboring Chad and now the Central African Republic.⁸ Despite the promise of peace following the end of Sudan's long-running north/south conflict in 2005, the security situation in the south of the country remains fragile, and the spillover effects of Uganda's civil strife

remain a serious obstacle to long-term peace. Likewise, the rise and fall of the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, the December 2006 military intervention of Ethiopian troops in Somalia amid reports of Eritrean support to the Islamists, the installation of the feckless and unpopular Transitional National Government in Mogadishu in early 2007, and the looming return of Somali warlords collectively paint a bleak security picture. Moreover, both these regional conflict clusters have become inexorably intertwined with the American effort to counter the rise of radical Islamists and the associated spread of international terrorism. It is this challenging and dangerous security environment that Washington has actively sought to change, through U.S. Central Command, as part of its strategy for combating international terrorism in Africa. That awareness of these challenges is even more acute is evidenced by the pending standing-up of U.S. Africa Command, which will “enhance our [American] efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth.”⁹

A Gathering Storm

Despite the 1998 terrorist bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that killed 263 people and injured thousands more, and the retaliatory American cruise missile strikes against Sudan that followed, Africa remained largely off the radar of American military planners until the events of September 11, 2001. Beginning in 2002, however, the Bush administration began to pay increasing attention to the continent: “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror.”¹⁰

Since then, Africa has only grown in importance to the United States, and many officials have come to see it as a key theater in the global fight against terrorism. In 2004 General James Jones, commander of U.S. European Command (which currently has responsibility for about three-fourths of the continent), remarked, “I am concerned about the large, ungoverned areas of Africa that are possible melting pots of the disenfranchised of the world, so to speak, the terrorist breeding grounds. I believe that we’re going to have to engage more in that theater.”¹¹ Congressman Edward Royce underscored this message when he declared that Africa “is the place where our fight against terrorism is being fought.”¹²

Washington has identified several critical regions or countries across the continent that it believes will be essential to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism effort in Africa. Not surprisingly, the Horn of Africa and Somalia top this list.¹³ With its long history of conflict and huge stockpile of weapons; strong trade, social, and religious ties to the nearby Arabian Peninsula; and shared poverty, poor governance, and legacy of external

interference, the Horn “provides a tasting menu for potential terrorists.”¹⁴ In particular, the U.S. Department of State has identified Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan as posing, together, the most serious threat to the American interests in the Horn, because of the active presence of al-Qa‘ida elements in these countries.¹⁵ The rise in Somalia of the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union—and its alleged international terrorist links—to power in mid-2006 only reinforced Washington’s worst fear: “an extremist, jihadist takeover of the government in Somalia.”¹⁶

To counter this gathering storm, shaping activities have been designed, and are ongoing, to prevent failed or failing states, like Somalia, from becoming terrorist safe havens. Further, the United States has sought to employ all instruments of national power to defeat violent Islamic extremism and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorists and their ideology.¹⁷ According to the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (NMSP-WOT), the American military will do this by denying terrorists what they need to operate and survive, particularly WMD/E (weapons of mass destruction or effects); enabling partner nations to counter terrorism; defeating terrorists and their organizations; countering state and nonstate support for terrorism, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies and partner nations; and contributing to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.¹⁸ More importantly, the NMSP-WOT emphasizes that these tasks “call for both *direct* and *indirect* approaches,” whereby the indirect approaches “focus on establishing the conditions for others to achieve success.”¹⁹ By utilizing both the “soft” and “hard” edges of American military power, the United States is expanding its security assistance programs to help nations combat terrorism, while at the same time actively tracking down terrorists and their supporting infrastructure. Beyond direct security assistance, the military is also charged with strengthening partnerships with key allies, gaining the support of moderate Muslim governments, and helping to address the underlying social and economic conditions that promote hatred and radicalization.

These strategic guidance documents align well with Washington’s desire to maintain the strategic initiative to combat international terrorism through preemptive action. Underpinning this approach is the ability drastically to transform, or shape, the security environment into one that is hostile to terrorist organizations. “Phase Zero” operations seek to address the underlying strategic environment in which an enemy may operate: their “ultimate goal is to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.”²⁰ Phase Zero, or shaping, operations are inherently preventive in nature and seek to maximize resources by fostering long-term capabilities among U.S. friends and allies; “If you don’t do anything and wait for something bad to happen, the cost of fixing that is always higher than the cost of what we’re doing now

which is low-level, consistent, building relationships,” says General Jones.²¹ This thinking also reflects a maturing attitude within the American military to move beyond the “find, fix, and finish” approach to address the root causes of terrorism rather than simply targeting high-value individuals.

In recent years much attention has been directed to “failed” or “failing” states as enabling factors in both generating and sustaining international terrorism. According to this argument, the collapse of the normal functions of government creates a situation conducive to the growth of terrorist organizations and also attracts international terrorist networks seeking a safe haven. As has been previously noted, poor governance, alienated populations, and weak institutions are defining hallmarks of many African countries today, making them ripe targets for terrorist exploitation, according to Washington’s thinking. According to the 2006 Failed States Index, which weighs social, economic, and political-military factors, three Horn of Africa countries—with Sudan topping the list of all countries worldwide—are in critical danger of state collapse.²² If the United States can help strengthen these highly vulnerable states, so goes the reasoning, it can eliminate terrorist breeding grounds, sanctuaries, and support structures across the continent. In turn, building capacity to improve governance and economic conditions and to maintain effective control over territory and people will be the central challenge in addressing the problem of failed and failing states. This approach aligns well with those calling for addressing the root causes of terrorism and not simply attacking the symptoms: “The optimal path to stability and reduced openings for terror is markedly to improve the manner in which governments . . . serve their citizens, that is, how they deliver governance.”²³

Theory into Action: Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

Growing worry that the Horn of Africa would become the “next Afghanistan” led Central Command to create the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in late 2002. Since that time some 1,500–2,000 military and nonmilitary task force personnel, based primarily at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, have been conducting counterterrorist operations, capacity building, and civic-action programs across the region.²⁴ These activities are ultimately designed “to prevent conflict, promote regional stability and protect Coalition interests” in the Horn;²⁵ the central task of CJTF-HOA, however, remains “focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist activity.”²⁶ Whether it means conducting joint antiterrorist operations, providing tactical training to regional allies, building military-to-military ties, or digging wells, the fundamental justification and driving force behind current

American engagement in the Horn is firmly grounded in the guiding principles of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. These principles—known as the “four Ds”* and set forth in the NMSP-WOT—provide the strategic guidance for prosecuting the war on terror. Consciously or not, the Horn has been made a test bed for Washington’s counterterrorism effort in Africa.²⁷

Direct military action against terrorists and suspected terrorist targets formally remains the core mission of the task force, but this purely kinetic aspect has given way to more classic shaping operations. The task force’s work is now more about winning hearts and minds in the region and building indigenous capabilities than killing or capturing terrorists. Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, a former CJTF-HOA commander, has said, “We feel the best way to counter terrorism is to go after the conditions that foster terrorism.”²⁸ Hence, CJTF-HOA personnel today are more likely to be engaged in building schools, clinics, and hospitals in Ethiopia; providing direct medical and veterinary assistance to local populations in northern Kenya; digging wells and handing out school supplies in Djibouti; or contributing to humanitarian assistance missions than in hunting down individual terrorist cells. In the first two years of CJTF-HOA’s existence, for example, it renovated thirty-three schools, eight clinics, and five hospitals; dug nearly a dozen wells; and conducted nearly forty medical and veterinary visits.²⁹ The task force’s annual budget has now grown to nearly \$50 million.³⁰ Such activities as these are often understood to be the exclusive domain of the U.S. Agency for International Development or nongovernmental organizations; nevertheless, Central Command has come to view this type of engagement as essential to the success of its current shaping strategy in the Horn.

CJTF-HOA is attempting to alter the strategic security environment of the region also by building partnerships and strengthening the security capacities of African governments. The Pentagon believes that the best method for fostering long-term stability and combating terrorism is by making regional allies more capable: “Many African nations [are] willing to help but they need [American] assistance.”³¹ By addressing this capabilities gap, the United States seeks to build powerful and like-minded allies, limit American military presence, more effectively leverage its resources, and create a security environment that is inhospitable to the rise or sustainment of terrorist organizations. Task force personnel have focused their training efforts on developing basic infantry skills and small-unit tactics, and on building local antiterrorist units, intelligence collection, and military support infrastructure. The Ethiopian and Kenyan militaries appear to be the primary recipients of this largess, but CJTF-HOA has worked successfully with all friendly governments in the region over the years.³²

* Defend the United States through preemptive measures; defeat terrorists; deny terrorists sanctuary and material assistance; and diminish ideological support for terrorist organizations.

Despite the strong emphasis on winning hearts and minds and building partner capacity, when circumstances warrant, the United States has not hesitated to engage in direct military action. Since its inception, CJTF-HOA forces have conducted numerous unilateral and combined military operations of varying scale and scope against terrorist targets of opportunity; in 2004, Brigadier General Mastin Robeson, USMC, who commanded the CJTF in 2003–2004, claimed that the task force was responsible for killing or capturing twenty-five senior al-Qa‘ida operatives.³³ Violent radical extremists, including U.S.-identified al-Qa‘ida affiliates operating from war-torn Somalia into neighboring countries, are seen as the most pressing direct threat to regional security.

Recent events in Somalia underscore the close—but often hidden—American military influence on events on the ground. According to press reports, the Pentagon provided significant intelligence and operational support in December 2006 to Ethiopian troops who were invading to oust the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union from power in Mogadishu.³⁴ Several sources also reported that U.S. ground forces, including Special Forces personnel, operated inside Somalia during December and January.³⁵ Washington has confirmed that it carried out in January 2007 two air strikes on suspected al-Qa‘ida personnel in Somalia although it has failed to acknowledge that the AC-130 gunships were apparently operating from a clandestine Ethiopian airstrip.³⁶ While certainly not the primary means relied upon to alter the Horn’s security environment—lethal operations by CJTF-HOA have been few and far between—hard military power can be useful if used judiciously.

With its small military footprint, civic-action focus, and cooperative approach to security, CJTF-HOA is often widely touted as the template for American counterterrorism in Africa through effective preemptive action. In 2005, Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, called the joint task force “a model for the future of DOD [Department of Defense]” with regard to its interagency focus.³⁷ Or as the current CJTF-HOA commander, Rear Admiral James Hart, has noted, “We’re arriving there early enough with an opportunity to help shape the environment, work towards a more secure environment, and hopefully, to allow people the opportunity to choose a direction to go in their lives that steers them away from extremism.”³⁸ Only time will tell if he is right.

The Challenge Ahead

After nearly five years of actively seeking to shape the security environment in the Horn, the United States finds itself much better positioned to combat international terrorism there and address the root causes of the region’s chronic insecurity and instability. It has developed stronger and increasingly more militarily capable regional allies. Improved situational awareness, enhanced intelligence collection, and increased government presence in outlying areas have hindered attempts of terrorist and extremist organizations to operate or find safe

haven. Washington has also burnished its public image, through humanitarian and civic action programs that have undoubtedly improved the daily lives of thousands. Not surprisingly, the Pentagon views its engagement in the Horn as highly successful to date.

Nonetheless, since 2002 the United States has only marginally improved regional stability. For all its successes, the shaping strategy has failed to address fundamentally persistent political and social problems that fuel and sustain conflict in the region. While additional resources would certainly enable CJTF-HOA to expand its activities, more of the same is not the long-term answer. The central challenge in the years ahead for U.S. engagement in the Horn, as well as for the rest of Africa, will be to integrate the lessons—both good and bad—of the past five years into a broader U.S.-African partnership that attacks the root causes of African instability while acknowledging the limits of the American ability to alter the security environment. To do this effectively, Washington must move its engagement paradigm away from a U.S. military-dominated approach designed to address hard security issues toward one aimed at achieving greater human security through nonmilitary actors and civil organizations. Such a shift would ultimately “reduce the drivers of conflict and instability” and produce “a secure global environment favorable to U.S. interests.”³⁹

The American military has become the preferred tool of American engagement in Africa since 2001, although the nature of this engagement has radically changed. As the evolution of CJTF-HOA has shown, the emphasis is now on flexing the softer side of military power via shaping programs, not kinetic operations. While this approach has proven to be highly effective in the early phases of U.S. engagement, it is ultimately constrained by the military’s own warfighting orientation, which often clashes with those of humanitarian and development organizations. Even when U.S. military and other groups do the same kind of work, “the objectives of the two are utterly dissimilar; humanitarian agencies aid the population without taking sides, and based on need, while the U.S. military serve their own political and military objectives alone.”⁴⁰ Rear Admiral Hunt underscored this point when he noted that CJTF-HOA “civil affairs and humanitarian projects are prioritized based on their potential to counter terrorist ideology in the region.”⁴¹ Accordingly, the burden of building political, economic, and social stability in the Horn needs to pass increasingly to other specialized elements of the U.S. government, and the military needs to move from a leading to a supporting role. The challenge thus becomes one of “demilitarizing” CJTF-HOA, transforming it into an interagency engagement tool (along the lines of the proposed Africa Command structure) while maintaining the ability to project military might when required.

Careful consideration should be given to this latter point. Too heavy a reliance on the sharp edge of military power is likely to be counterproductive, to undercut longer-term

political objectives for short-term military gains. Recent events in Somalia bear this out. There the United States apparently relied on military means, in the form of Ethiopian military intervention, to oust what both Washington and Addis Ababa saw as a growing radical Islamist threat to the region.⁴² The incursion was highly successful in removing the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union and installing a more pro-Western and friendly government in Mogadishu, but long-term prospects for peace in the divided country seem as bleak as ever. American and Ethiopian military involvement in Somalia has most likely produced more instability and insecurity, by facilitating a return to warlordism, undermining diplomatic and regional peace efforts, and stoking Somali xenophobia and radicalism.⁴³ Likewise, strengthening the Ethiopian government's military capability may have had unintended negative consequences for that country's domestic political situation, especially in regard to what regime critics see as backsliding on Ethiopian democratic reforms and civil liberties in recent years.

The Somalia episode also illustrates the danger of American shaping operations becoming too closely associated or entangled, in the name of security, with the policy interests of a single country or regime. As Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen point out, "the decision to support Ethiopia's military invasion without devising a broader political strategy was a stunning mistake."⁴⁴ To many in the Horn, Washington is increasingly aligning its policies with Addis Ababa and thus indirectly siding with Ethiopia in regional disputes, thereby raising serious concerns in Asmara, Khartoum, and the streets of Mogadishu. To the extent that this is true, it undermines the ability of the United States to mediate conflict and serve as a positive force for regional stability. Likewise, the use of military-to-military relationships to build partnership capacity of America's African allies, while highly effective, needs to be balanced against the need of the United States to promote democratic governance. Tipping the scales toward security capacity at the expense of human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and transparency will not serve the long-term goal of regional stability or human dignity.

The daunting challenge of how to work more effectively through sub-regional African organizations, most notably the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, will undoubtedly test U.S. strategic patience. The American desire "to get things done" is often perceived as aggressive unilateralism and dismissiveness toward local concerns. To avoid these pitfalls, traditional military shaping operations need to become more aligned with, and supportive of, the wider diplomatic and political process of defusing conflict and building security. The Pentagon's planned formation of Africa Command may provide the institutional platform to do this in a truly interagency structure that "really puts the [Department of Defense] guys in support of other agencies," according to General Peter Pace, speaking as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁵ It will be a long and often torturous road, to be sure, but—as in

ending the long-running civil war in southern Sudan in 2005—the United States has proven it can work.

Africa, with all its problems and promise—weak and failing states, fragile democracies, relentless cycles of violence, peace, and reconciliation—has burst to the top of the American security agenda. From striking poverty and great human suffering to growing economic empowerment and perseverance, Africa poses vast shaping challenges—as well as opportunities—for U.S. strategy in the struggle against international terrorism as encapsulated in the volatile Horn of Africa. While the counterterrorism issue has brought the continent to the forefront of American concerns, the issues of security and stability are much more complex; they are deeply rooted in centuries of African history. It behooves American military leaders to remain mindful of that critical reality when attempting to alter the Horn's security environment.

Through such regional security initiatives as CJTF-HOA the United States has made great progress in transforming the security environment in the region, but more needs to be done. Moreover, it needs to be done differently as American engagement matures and evolves. Washington will need to move away from its myopic focus on terrorism as the wellspring of all the region's security ills and toward a long-term and comprehensive regional shaping strategy that truly tackles the problems of African, vice American, security. In the end, the American strategic objective of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa can be accomplished only by helping African societies solve their problems from their own security perspectives. This will be the ultimate challenge for U.S. strategy in the years ahead.

Notes

1. Defined as the “core Horn of Africa,” countries (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia) plus Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. This subregion is home to nearly 200 million people and ranks in the bottom fifth of the UN Human Development Index.
2. “Fact Sheet,” *Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa*, www.hoa.centcom.mil.
3. Council on Foreign Relations, *More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), p. 59.
4. Ruth Iyob and Edmond Keller, “US Policy in the Horn: Grappling with a Difficult Legacy,” in *East Africa and the Horn*, ed. Dorina Bekoe (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006), p. 107.
5. *U.N. Human Development Report* (New York: United Nations, 2006), available at www.undp.org.
6. This is probably best epitomized by the current struggle between Ethiopia and Eritrea in multiple arenas for regional power and influence, a struggle that both sides tend to see as a winner-take-all battle for regional preeminence.
7. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Blowing the Horn,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007), p. 59.

8. For Darfur violence see *ibid.*, pp. 61–62.
9. “U.S. Creating New Africa Command to Coordinate Military Efforts,” *U.S. Info*, 6 February 2007.
10. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), p. 10
11. “Trained African Armies Key to Fight in Africa,” *allAfrica.com*, 8 March 2004.
12. U.S. Representative Edward R. Royce remarks on release of Africa Policy Advisory report, *Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa*, Washington, D.C., 8 July 2004.
13. The other regions of concern include East Africa with a focus on Kenya and Tanzania and the trans-Saharan. For more information on the latter, see Stephen Emerson, “The Trans-Saharan Arc,” in *Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism*, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey Murer (New York: Routledge, 2006).
14. Robert Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 2.
15. *CNSnews.com*, 5 May 2004.
16. “No Place for Extremism in Somalia Dialogue, U.S. Official Says,” *USInfo*, 11 July 2006.
17. “Strategic Vision for the War on Terror,” in *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2006), p. 7.
18. U.S. Defense Department, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 1 February 2006), pp. 23–24.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 23 [emphasis added].
20. General Charles Wald, “New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 43 (4th Quarter 2006), p. 73.
21. “Marine Gen. James L. Jones Interview with Pauline Jelinik,” *Associated Press*, 31 August 2006.
22. The three Horn countries are Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. See *The Fund for Peace*, www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php.
23. Rotberg, *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, p. 3.
24. CJTF-HOA defines its operational area as comprising the total airspace and land areas of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The task force is staffed with an eclectic assortment of National Guardsmen, military doctors and veterinarians, contractors, engineers, Special Forces personnel, Marines, and civilian personal from a number of U.S. government agencies.
25. “Fact Sheet.”
26. *Ibid.*
27. The other two major U.S.-sponsored African programs are the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative and the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative.
28. “Horn of Africa May Be the Next Terror Front,” *Associated Press*, 21 October 2006.
29. *GlobalSecurity.org*, www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-hoa.htm.
30. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Winning Hearts and Minds in the Horn of Africa: Humanitarian Aid in the War on Terror,” *Harvard International Review* (Web edition), hir.harvard.edu/articles/1481/1.
31. U.S. Defense Department, *Office of the Secretary of Defense Security Strategy for Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, International Security Affairs, 2004).
32. See Peter Woodward, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 143–50, and Dorina Bekoe, ed., *East Africa and the Horn* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 109–11, for a detailed look at the evolving U.S.-Ethiopian security relationship.
33. J. Stephen Morrison and Princeton Lyman, “Countering the Terrorist Threat in Africa,” in *Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy*, ed. Walter Kansteiner and J. Stephen Morrison (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies), p. 108.
34. “U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda,” *New York Times*, 23 February 2007.
35. *Ibid.*; “US Troops ‘Spotted’ in Somalia South,” *Kuwait Times* (online edition), 22 January 2007.
36. “US Confirms Air Strike on al-Qaeda Leaders in Somalia,” *VOA News*, 9 January 2007; “Military Official Reports Second US Air Strike in Somalia,” *VOA News*, 24 January 2007; “U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda.”

37. "Washington's Long War and Its Strategy in the Horn of Africa," *Power and Interest News Report*, 9 November 2005, www.pinr.com.
38. "New U.S. Task Force Commander, Staff Prepare for Posting to Africa," Armed Forces Press Service, 19 January 2007.
39. U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Military Support to Shaping Operations JOC," Department of Defense document, January 2007.
40. David Curtis, head of Doctors Without Borders in Somalia, as quoted in Kenyon Lischer, "Winning Hearts and Minds in the Horn of Africa."
41. Kenyon Lischer, "Winning Hearts and Minds in the Horn of Africa."
42. For a comprehensive look at Somali Islamists see International Crisis Group, *Somalia's Islamists*, Africa Report 100 (Brussels: 12 December 2005).
43. David Ignatius highlights many of these concerns in his commentary "Ethiopia's Iraq," *Washington Post*, 13 May 2007.
44. Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, "Blowing the Horn," p. 69.
45. "Pace: Military, Other Agencies to Forge New Relationships in Africa," American Forces Press Service, 11 February 2007.

Strategic Communication and the Diplomacy of Deeds

DENNIS LYNN

The United States has lost its positive international image, and its foreign policy inflames public opinion across the world. Across the globe, heads of state are finding it politically useful to dissociate their countries from America's embrace and oppose U.S. foreign policy, thereby currying favor with domestic audiences. At the same time, Islamic extremists have effectively executed a media strategy of sowing doubt and dissension in the United States and its coalition allies, eroding America's will to fight and intimidating or isolating others who would take sides against the jihadists. New programs are needed to combat international terrorism, and they should be tailored to construct a new image of the United States as a partner of choice. America's ability to defeat adversaries will require the creation of new coalition arrangements and the taking of the informational offensive. In the struggle for hearts and minds, ideas matter; a strategic narrative that emphasizes a positive image of hope and opportunity must be promoted. This chapter explores how the Navy can support the aims of joint shaping through the use of strategic communication to shape world opinion, solidify key relationships, and bolster new partnerships.

Strategic Communication Defined

The U.S. government now recognizes strategic communication (SC) as an important element of power. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) defined it as “focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.”¹ The separate disciplines of public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), military diplomacy, and information operations/psychological operations are now components of a grand and dynamic strategic communication strategy that is being managed in an

interagency fashion to achieve maximum effectiveness. The Defense Department has now begun to “instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, developing programs, plans and policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government’s overall strategic objectives.”² Seamless communication across the U.S. government, with an eye to its effect abroad, is an overarching goal.

The United States must meld the traditional sources of power—military and economic—with a new source, informational power, to achieve what Joseph Nye believes is the fundamental goal of power, “the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants.”³ Information, unlike the other two sources, is “soft,” because of its “ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce. It means that others want what the United States wants. . . . Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”⁴ The United States has soft power and must calibrate it with its other means. For instance, America’s goodwill activities offer enormous soft-power persuasion possibilities. However, rarely are they formally and actively publicized to a global audience as a way of enhancing American prestige and its image, not to mention of balancing negative news reports. SC can “operationalize” soft power and thus transform humanitarian efforts, security assistance, and economic aid into material for reshaping the image of the United States in the world. The message, or narrative, must distinguish the United States from its adversaries, present it as a country working cooperatively with other nations in building more prosperous societies, and seek partner-country involvement both in solving mutual problems through common effort and in communicating positive messages of American help to respective domestic audiences. The cognitive domain is the target. Recent operations offer lessons essential to constructing a strategic narrative for the United States.

The Earthquake

On 8 October 2005 a devastating, 7.6-magnitude earthquake hit the northern part of Pakistan; over the next five months 1,771 aftershocks were recorded.⁵ The United States and its allies responded in a massive way to save lives. Rear Admiral Mike LeFever, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 1, was reassigned by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to command a joint task force that would lead Operation LIFELINE and with it what would become the longest-lasting and most extensive relief operation in American history. He would not leave Pakistan for six months. Inside the country within forty-eight hours, Rear Admiral LeFever began to organize a team to execute an intricate, joint human assistance/disaster response operation, one with significant political sensitivity.

The enormity of the destruction was significant: 73,338 people dead, 128,309 injured, and over three million homeless.⁶ Likewise, the level of humanitarian relief was

enormous: 11,620 short tons of cargo moved, 5,195 helicopter sorties flown, 34,914 patients treated, and 1,900 U.S. military personnel involved (providing command-and-control, aviation, medical, and engineering support).⁷ Additionally, there was an incredible outpouring of support for the victims from eighty-six foreign governments, 250 nongovernmental organizations, and twenty-two United Nations entities.⁸ Organizing such an effort required trained personnel, heavy equipment, and superior logistics. Complicating the problem was the fact that Rear Admiral LeFever's team worked among a population known to sympathize with and support Taliban operations in neighboring Afghanistan. The combination of earthquake devastation, the economic support needed to help Pakistan recover, the military's logistical and organizational skill, the political-military uncertainty on the ground, and the need for public affairs/public diplomacy expertise to communicate American relief efforts to Pakistanis all combined to make LIFELINE a case study in how to organize a team, create unity in effort, and execute a strategic communication strategy.

General John Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander at the time, gave succinct instructions to Rear Admiral LeFever: provide Pakistan relief and improve American-Pakistani relations. America's quick response in manpower and equipment, much of it already deployed offshore or operating in the region, saved an estimated five hundred thousand lives (the United States provided about 80 percent of the total relief to Pakistan). Improvement in political relations, however, was complicated by past cuts in U.S.-Pakistan military exchanges, which had strained relations between the two countries. The U.S. team was careful in its public pronouncements to portray its presence as strictly one of providing relief and supporting the Pakistani military. The strategy boosted the image of the United States in Pakistan: by November 2005 favorable opinion was up to 46 percent from 23 percent, and unfavorable opinion fell to 28 percent from 48.⁹ The change in public opinion happened because the United States had "shown" up in friendly force and had conducted a carefully considered successful strategic communication/public diplomacy operation to promote U.S.-Pakistani relations. The purposeful effort to create a positive American image enabled success in the relief operation.

Rear Admiral LeFever accentuated this point when he observed, "CDAC-PAK [Combined Disaster Assistance Center–Pakistan] used an aggressive communication strategy based on four cornerstones: Show the Flag, Face to Face Communication, Good News Stories, Inform the People."¹⁰ CDAC-PAK was the U.S. lead organization in the relief effort. Its communication team leveraged previous U.S. government SC planning to bring together quickly an experienced team of State Department professionals from the embassy, supplemented by military public affairs officers (PAOs) and other Department of Defense (DoD) resources, to work with Pakistanis and a wide assortment of international organizations. Embassy public-diplomacy staff members used their

expertise in the political realities of Pakistan and their knowledge of national media outlets to tell the story each day. Successful planning and real-time integration within the U.S. team were crucial to the overall success of LIFELINE.

The strategic communication plan was executed by a number of different means. The embassy produced daily news reports of America's assistance to the Pakistani people, always showing examples of support to the host country. Pakistani citizens would read or see reports of Navy Seabees rebuilding schools in an "adopt a village" program. Combat camera personnel were deployed from the United States to capture imagery for high-quality videos for distribution—showing, for example, Chinook helicopters evacuating the injured or American doctors treating the elderly and immunizing the young. Pakistani media were often embedded on helicopters to cover these stories first-hand. The Pakistani government was seen receiving over \$7.2 million in medical, engineering, and aircraft refueling equipment. Pakistanis would have seen the dock landing ship *USS Pearl Harbor* (LSD 52) off-loading heavy engineering equipment in Karachi. Souvenirs of knit caps, lapel pins, etc., were handed out, each with images of American and Pakistani flags on them, thus helping to "brand" the message of bilateral friendship. Continuity in these actions was critical; international media often lose interest in a story after the first few weeks, after which U.S. government public diplomacy/strategic communication specialists would have to fill the gap. LIFELINE was a success both for what it accomplished in saving human lives and for the opinions changed in favor of the United States. The combined effort of the U.S. military, State Department, and the host country produced results.

Operation LIFELINE proved that the United States could create in real time a media-savvy, targeted, and effective effort. Relief supplies and machinery arrived quickly. U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) deployed overseas for the first time and effectively supported CDAC-PAK, explaining American intentions to the Pakistani people and working closely with domestic media outlets. Everyone understood the mission. There were clear objectives. Sufficient media means, assets, and experience were present. Senior U.S. leadership recognized the priority of SC and supported it. The geographic combatant commander/State relationship, among a number of interagency efforts, worked well. The model of central management/delegated execution was productive. LIFELINE media efforts were constant, continuous, and coalition focused. The message was received and understood by the Pakistani people, as indicated by later polls.

Strategic Narrative

Operation LIFELINE, then, is an example of the United States consciously telling a story about itself—that it responds to suffering and provides relief assistance immediately

after tragedies. The United States is one of the few countries in the world that can translate promises into food, water, and medical assistance anywhere in the world within a day of a natural disaster. There is much criticism of the United States as the “911” force that kicks down doors, but these same capabilities enable it to put out fires, provide medical treatment, and enable other governments, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations to conduct relief efforts.

Lawrence Freedman calls this storytelling the “strategic narrative,” the “compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn. Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring the responses of others to developing events.”¹¹ The world knows the United States can and will help. Strategic narratives are analytical devices that help audiences make sense of the world and integrate everyday political events into some larger coherent whole. Al-Qa‘ida uses images of American military actions for its own strategic narrative of infidel crusaders trying to dominate Muslims, urging Muslims to unite and drive them from their territories. Al-Qa‘ida statements are directed to winning Muslims to its side and giving followers religious sanction for violence. A narrative establishes simple objectives and allows for decentralization of operations. The idea of the infidel in the land of Mohammad rallies deep-seated suspicion of Western intentions and generates a valuable, interpretative strategic narrative.

The coalition of nations that oppose the jihadist ideology will need to devise a strategic narrative too, to attract a “following” and challenge the extremist narrative. A “narrative-centric warfare” approach will require the United States to develop a genuine understanding of foreign cultures across the world. An appealing narrative requires that. As one anthropologist has noted, “Cultural knowledge and warfare are inextricably bound”; further, “Cultural knowledge of adversaries should be considered a national security priority.”¹² Extending that cultural insight to include nations the United States wishes to attract into a coalition would seem prudent too. A strategic narrative must exploit cultural knowledge to find convergence in objectives and create cohesion among partners. A common framework helps coalitions weather the “bad news days” that invariably occur when fighting such a determined foe. When each “fighter” internalizes the objectives and values inherent in a strategic narrative, the narrative “can act almost as a substitute for normal command and control.”¹³

A U.S.-coalition strategic narrative can also undermine the enemy’s narrative, because values and vision differentiate the United States from al-Qa‘ida: the Islamic extremists want to divide and conquer, where the United States leads coalitions to promote sovereignty and prosperity. By infusing a myriad of security and humanitarian actions with greater purpose, members of a target audience of the “undecided” can observe and

make strategic choices to reject violent extremists' messages. Narrative-centric warfare can become a powerful connector of peoples externally and bring cohesion internally to the range of economic, diplomatic, and military efforts that a global coalition will need to sustain. To this end, changes in the interagency process are necessary, and it appears that the U.S. leadership is "getting the message."

Interagency Developments

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, is in charge of overall international strategic communication policy for the U.S. government. She oversees directly the public diplomacy efforts of the Department of State and its overseas missions; she also leads an interagency Policy Coordinating Committee, formed to connect public diplomacy efforts. Her testimony when confirmed in July 2005 declared how important reinvigorating the interagency process would be in reorienting public diplomacy: "President Bush and Secretary Rice have asked me to lead that effort from the State Department, to identify and marshal all communication and public diplomacy resources of the different government agencies and provide leadership to make U.S. efforts more coordinated and more strategic."¹⁴ Additionally, she seeks to keep policy making and public diplomacy planning closely aligned; their symbiotic interaction means that words and deeds must be kept in sync.

The State-DoD relationship is the primary interagency relationship in this regard. Cooperation between the two departments is underscored in Ambassador Hughes's three strategic imperatives:

- Offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America's belief in freedom, justice, opportunity, and respect for all.
- Isolate and marginalize the violent extremists, confront their ideology of tyranny and hate, undermine their efforts to portray the West as in conflict with Islam by empowering mainstream voices and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures and contributions.
- Foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures, and faiths throughout the world.¹⁵

Existing programs are being revitalized, and new initiatives are being implemented to support these three strategic imperatives. State provides a liaison officer to DoD's primary SC working group. In addition to the political advisers at military commands to provide political expertise, public diplomacy advisers are now being placed inside some combatant commands. There is also discussion about embedding experienced DoD public affairs and information operations officers from the combatant commander staffs into public affairs staffs at embassies. Additionally, the State Department's Rapid

Response Unit produces quick summaries and talking points on hot issues of the day for key senior officials to use with foreign officials and foreign media to ensure that public diplomacy themes are propagated. Lastly, State has positioned public diplomacy officers, conversant in local languages, in key locales to engage media in active, positive public diplomacy and to counter false portrayals of American actions and policies. State and DoD are working together to synchronize their respective efforts.

Within the Defense Department, a number of activities are closing identified capability gaps. An SC “roadmap” now enumerates shortfalls and sets deadlines. Most importantly, a Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) has been formed to unite information-related elements and activities in DoD to keep operations, policy, and communication synchronized. Information-related activities like defense support to public diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations/psychological operations are being coordinated, so as to help leadership understand and utilize nonkinetic means of persuasion. Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, director of the SCIG and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication, oversees an institutionalized strategic communication process that seeks to provide leadership, guidance, focus, and synergy in this area. As SCIG director he is the principal DoD person to synchronizing interagency SC efforts among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, and the military departments.¹⁶ Rear Admiral Thorp sees the new SC process as evidence of a new school of strategic communication, one that is “continuous and integrated from the beginning of each operational planning cycle,” and where the “SC cycle moves quickly and can repeat itself several times in the course of operational planning,” providing “a process to integrate and synchronize the DIME [diplomatic, information, military and economic] effort, affecting the way we work to achieve desired effects.”¹⁷

Navy Efforts

The Navy is adapting to the strategic environment and meeting the challenges laid down in the QDR. A number of initiatives have been undertaken, and more are under way, that will reshape Navy internal and external communications to “operationalize” information more effectively. While the Navy will largely work in tandem with the other services, U.S. government agencies, allies, and international organizations, in support of the warfighters, its contribution will come largely from its ability to leverage what is special about sailors, the role the service plays in the maritime domain, and how its unique capabilities and approach to SC connects to the larger diplomatic, information, military, and economic means at the national level.

As the QDR makes clear, fighting the information war is a vital part of fighting irregular warfare. *Naval Operations Concept 2006* reinforces the point: “U.S. Naval forces will

use and protect information to influence adversaries, advance friendly objectives, and shape the operating environment to our advantage.”¹⁸ How can the Navy do this and contribute to the larger U.S. government effort to win hearts and minds? The first step is to understand the big picture and the need to support the larger “U.S. government team.” State has outlined its strategic imperatives in partnership with Defense. The United States is propagating its strategic narrative through the synergy of words and deeds—Navy strategic communication and operations must be constantly reviewed to ensure consistency with it. More directly, the Navy needs to be a strong player within the SCIG process that is now under way and commit itself to this joint process, which supports the combatant commanders—that is, bringing maritime-domain-related SC proposals to the Strategic Communications Integration Group. It is through the SCIG that the Navy synchronizes its efforts.

A March 2007 “Priority Tasking Memo” is the cornerstone of the Navy’s intent to support the QDR SC mandate and its approach to doing so. Under a focus area of “Building Strong Partnerships,” it lists SC as a force enabler for the twenty-first-century Navy.¹⁹ In the memo the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) outlined nine “you wills” in support of Navy SC, most of them listing the Chief of Naval Information in either the leading or a supporting role. Key initiatives include:

- Establishment of strategic communication throughout the Navy as an integrating process
- Integration of SC into operational planning and policy development
- An implementation plan, synchronizing all communication capabilities (information operations, public affairs, military diplomacy, defense support to public diplomacy, and visual information)
- Closure of capability and capacity gaps
- Support to the SCIG
- Development by the Defense Information School of basic, intermediate, and advanced courses to help train PAOs and civilian equivalents in the principles of SC
- A “battlespace strategic communication” course for PAOs assigned to battle groups, naval component commanders, fleet commanders, and combatant commanders
- An SC class for unrestricted line officers (especially prospective commanding officers and executive officers).

Navy leadership is making strategic communications a priority. All of this in time will help support the warfighter, not only because each initiative together adds up to more than the sum of its parts, but because they collectively reflect evolving recognition by

the Navy culture that SC is a total fleet responsibility, that all deployed sailors, naval assets, operations, and exercises are possible messengers. Admiral Mullen has reaffirmed an important internal U.S. government SC objective by making clear to all members the chain of command their role: “They will be expected to understand and foster cooperation in cultures far different from our own. They will be ambassadors, educators, health care providers, mentors, and friends to a diverse cross-section of the global community.”²⁰ Strategic communication is no longer something unrelated unessential to Navy power projection; it is central to the influence the Navy can exert to assist in achieving national political objectives. A report on or a video of the USS *Pearl Harbor* in Karachi unloading tons of food, blankets, and other supplies after a devastating earthquake supports the strategic narrative; the full soft-power persuasive effect is achieved when information operations, public affairs, military diplomacy, defense support to public diplomacy, and visual information are artfully integrated.

The SCIG process in time will also create habits of integration and synergy. Navy SC is aligning itself to make this happen. The Navy has recently put forth a plan to create an internal Navy strategic communication process, overseen by a Navy SCIG, to imitate the SCIG process and to be consistent with the Navy Enterprise model.²¹ An SC “Plan Template” has been developed to ensure consistency. There is an SC Working Group that will help decision making by identifying desired effects, key audiences, and the communication environment, both “up front” and throughout the decision cycle. There will be a small secretariat to oversee the process. Relevant codes or fleets will be asked to develop communication plans. Importantly, fleet staffs, Navy Staff directorates, and regions can nominate issues to be addressed by leadership. The new process helps Navy leadership look ahead, foresee unintended consequences of decisions, and align itself with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The second area where the Navy makes an impact, and an area emphasized in the CNO’s Priority Memo, is in education and training. Indeed, no better investment can be made than to educate designated officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians in the value of strategic communication and the role they can play in it. Foreign area officer programs also strengthen SC capabilities. To that end, interaction between foreign naval officers and American ones, in either formal exchanges or exercises, helps create personal bonds. Understanding foreign cultures is critical in the present environment, and here Navy education can help bring forward expertise from the service, other U.S. government agencies, and academia. Increasing foreign-language training is an obvious must. Cultural situational awareness provides tactical and strategic advantages.

Thirdly, images can be force multipliers; the Navy can help by becoming a constant and timely content provider. Foreign audiences can be influenced by viewing naval shaping

activities, which would further underscore a perception of the United States as a friendly country and amplify the distinctions between the United States and jihadists. The Navy should look to collect routinely “video vignettes” of U.S. security, economic, and humanitarian assistance, and, as bandwidth and production processing allow, expeditiously disseminate them to U.S. government public diplomacy experts, who can quickly make them available to foreign media. Much of the video equipment and media personnel already resides in the Navy. The United States, working in coalition with other nations to solve common problems, tells the right story, and when that story is told by the other countries’ media it is even more impressive.

The story opportunities are numerous. An example is UNITAS 48-07, a multinational exercise designed to increase interoperability of navies in the Americas (this year, participants were Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as well as Spain and the United States). It was a great opportunity to work with South American navies. Concurrently, gifts of toys and other products were made to a local charity under the auspices of Project Handclasp, a program where gifts are presented by U.S. Navy personnel on behalf of the American people. Sailors also took part in a wreath-laying ceremony commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the loss of the cruiser ARA *General Belgrano*. Also, a number of sailors helped to paint a hospital. Such exercises occur every year, and the Navy interacts with dozens of countries annually. These events are the measure of American goodwill, they can help America continually shape its image, and they need to be covered by local media. The Navy already helps future SC efforts by proactively and regularly providing video imagery content for news stories that State or DoD can disseminate to a world audience.

Carrier strike groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups carry public affairs complements on board when they deploy. These teams could capture video of operations and exercises that involve allies and transmit them, together with press releases, up the chain and then quickly into awaiting media outlets in targeted countries. This would have its own challenges—for instance, training, classification, and bandwidth, especially for ships not operating in a CSG or ESG—but it would be important coalition-building work. The power of images, engaging ideas, and real-time information can help mold world public opinion in America’s favor.

A fourth contribution, which is a natural follow-up to becoming a content provider, is to work with foreign media in a proactive and sustained way. Navy media teams may need their capabilities bolstered or supplemented from DoD’s Visual Information office or JPASE, which together have immense media experience and equipment capability. As the Pakistani earthquake experience indicated, foreign media is often especially receptive to stories that benefit their country or show their national military

involvement. This interaction with foreign media is a way to spread the message. When possible and advisable, the Navy should invite foreign media aboard ship to report on stories directly. Given the number of port visits by Navy ships each year, pictures and interviews should be a regular part of Navy efforts to reach and engage friendly or neutral audiences. Assistance from geographic combatant commanders and the State Department in setting up media events will be necessary.

Also, the Navy has an assortment of vessels in the Military Sealift Command that perform extraordinary maritime missions, often in cooperation with other nations. For instance, one oceanographic survey vessel, the USNS *Bruce C. Heezen* (T-AGS 64), recently worked with the Philippine navy surveying its waters. The HSV-2 *Swift* undertook a pirate-suppression mission for CENTCOM and on another occasion worked with Panama for training in port security and port vulnerability. The hospital ship USNS *Mercy* (T-AH 19) has provided tsunami relief, and *Comfort* (T-AH 20) assisted during Hurricane Katrina. These ships are especially valuable as conveyors of American goodwill and support to friends.

Fifth, the Navy needs to be a provider of ideas, concepts, and plans for expanding or strengthening bilateral or regional influence. In a context of utilizing and synchronizing diplomatic, information, military, and economic power, the “thousand-ship navy” represents a far-reaching concept that can be leveraged for SC aims. CNO Mullen’s TSN vision has been articulated as “... a combination of national, international, and private-industry cooperation to provide the platforms, people, and protocols necessary to secure the seas against the transnational threat.”²² The strategic communication story is plain: a collection of like-minded nations agreeing voluntarily to share information and responsibility against common threats. Everyone benefits. The opportunity is open to nations affected by the transnational threats of “... piracy, smuggling, drug trading, illegal immigration, banditry, human smuggling and slavery, environmental attack, trade disruption, weapons proliferation including weapons of mass destruction, political and religious extremism, and terrorism.”²³ Global problems require coalition solutions.

Two current examples of how the TSN could work are CTF 150 and Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR. The former involves warships from Pakistan, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, and others, that conduct maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean—altogether, an area of 2.5 million square miles. In April 2006, a Pakistani admiral took charge of the combined task force. Under ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, NATO naval vessels patrol the Mediterranean monitoring shipping for possible terrorist activity. Russia and Ukraine have also participated; relationships are being extended to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries of Algeria,

Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, and Mauritania. But how much of this important work is viewed by foreign audiences?

TSN-related initiatives are SC “targets of opportunity”; they would reassure allies and friends. They feed the strategic narrative of America as part of a vast coalition of nations coming together to fight a common enemy. Admiral Mullen has realized the public-opinion potential of Navy global efforts. In a January 2006 article he reflected on the Navy’s leading role in helping the people of Indonesia after the terrible December 2004 tsunami: “We literally built a city at sea for no other purpose than to serve the needs of other people. Aside from the lives we—along with our international partners—helped save, we started changing hearts and minds.”²⁴ The world saw the quick-response humanitarian effort, and Indonesian public feelings toward America improved dramatically, but in time opinion dipped again. Sustaining foreign opinion friendly to the United States will become easier, however, as the relationships among TSN nations and in other programs deepens and is made consistent.

India is a good example of how the TSN concept can reach out to a country that has historically guarded its neutrality. One Indian naval analyst has stated that TSN’s “information sharing would neither impinge on India’s sovereignty, nor would it conflict with international law.”²⁵ Further, India has been facing a terrorist problem at home, making it reconsider cooperative opportunities. Another Indian defense analyst has suggested that the United States “needs to package it in a manner as to appeal not just to navies, but also to governments and the lay public.”²⁶ TSN appeals to nations to fight common problems like international terrorism together; for the United States the appeal is in the realization that the maritime problems it faces are greater than it can manage alone. Recently Admiral Mullen appealed to the visiting head of the Chinese navy, Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, to consider participation in TSN.²⁷

There are other maritime venues too that can be exploited for positive publicity. For instance, the *National Strategy for Maritime Security* articulates why securing the maritime domain is so important for all countries. The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy lays out numerous initiatives to implement it.²⁸ A strategic communication plan should accompany such multinational endeavors, to bring to life diplomacy and international cooperation. For instance, the Proliferation Security Initiative is a story of regional and global naval cooperation to prevent dangerous military items from being shipped. These are all newsworthy, and they provide stories for shaping world opinion. As the CNO has said, “every nation has a stake in global security and stability, and a distinct, unique capability, as well as a great desire, to contribute. Our goal is to extend the peace through an inter-connected community of maritime nations.”²⁹

Lastly, the Navy helps the effort through its consolidation and integration of departments that have a role in “operationalizing” information. In order to provide better information-operations support to combatant and Navy component commanders, the Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) has recently subsumed a number of disparate offices involved in intelligence and information operations.³⁰ Additionally, Navy Information Operation Centers and Fleet Information Officer Centers are collocated with National Security Agency cryptologic centers; the latter will now directly support NETWARCOM. Service and national capabilities are being aligned the better to support the warfighter. Tools like “Internet Relay Chat” have increased situational awareness by allowing users to exchange information across the world, disseminating intelligence, creating an unclassified common operating picture, and thereby helping realize the thousand-ship navy.³¹ Therefore, information operations and intelligence are being restructured to enhance Navy informational capabilities; the challenge will be to exploit better intelligence and translate it into influence in the “open” world. The narrative of the thousand-ship navy is one cooperation, not U.S. hegemony—and this must be more effectively communicated.

In the new strategic paradigm, the Navy has an increasing political-military role to play. The Navy’s commitment to expand its informational capabilities is paying dividends through bringing nations and new capabilities together to fight common enemies. A strategic narrative is forming to bring consistency and purpose to national efforts. A new Navy strategic communication process, reorganization, new concepts, and investment in people and training will make the Navy a powerful contributor to those efforts. In the present strategic environment, the Navy has important SC advantages. Each ship and each sailor is potentially an SC asset. The fleet offers presence, but without a large footprint. The Navy can go almost anywhere. In the ideological battle, where information and images mean influence, the Navy’s good works need to become content for U.S. government strategic communication efforts with other friendly governments and foreign media—content that helps keep populations aligned to the United States.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

A	AFRICOM	[U.S.] African Command
	AIS	Automated Identification System
	AOR	area of responsibility
C	CDAC-PAK	Combined Disaster Assistance Center–Pakistan
	CENTCOM	[U.S.] Central Command
	CINC	commander in chief
	CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
	CNE	Commander Naval Forces Europe
	CNE-C6F	Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet
	CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
	CSG	carrier strike group
	CSI	Container Security Initiative
	CTF	Commander Task Force
	C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
	C6F	Commander Sixth Fleet
D	DIME	diplomatic, information, military and economic
	DoD [DOD]	[U.S.] Department of Defense
	DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy
E	ESG	expeditionary strike group
	EUCOM	[U.S.] European Command
F	FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia]
	FMF	Foreign Military Financing
	FY	fiscal year

G	GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
	GFS	Global Fleet Station
	GMP	Global Maritime Partnership
	GOG	Gulf of Guinea
H	HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
I	IGO	intergovernmental organization
	IMET	International Military Education and Training
J	JCA	joint capability area
	JCTD	joint capability technology demonstration
	JOC	joint operating concept
	JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element
	J7 [Joint Staff]	Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development
M	MDA	maritime domain awareness
	MPP	Maritime Partnership Program
	MSP	mission strategic plan
	MSSIS	Maritime Safety and Security Information System
N	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
	NETWARCOM	Naval Network Warfare Command
	NGO	nongovernmental organization
	NMSP-WOT	<i>National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism</i>
O	OAE	Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR
	OBSH	Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY
P	PAO	public affairs officer
	PfP	Partnership for Peace
	PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party [Partiya Karkerê Kurdistan]

PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
Q QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
R RMAC	Regional Maritime Awareness Capability
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
S SC	strategic communication
SCIG	Strategic Communication Integration Group
SOUTHCOM	[U.S.] Southern Command
T TSC	theater security cooperation
TSCP	theater security cooperation plan
TSN	thousand-ship navy
U UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
W WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMD/E	weapons of mass destruction or effects

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